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I. Introduction
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution
provides: "No person shall ...be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... " If a refugee who has
committed a deportable offense and served his sentence is
subsequently deported from a place where he calls home to a place
where he would face persecution, he could literally be said to have
been twice put in jeopardy of life and limb. That seems to be a prima
facie violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth

Amendment.2

This constitutional guarantee is, however, not

1. See U.S. Const., Amend. V.
2. Although initially this clause was deemed to be binding only against the Federal
Government, it has later been recognized that it also applies against the several states. See
Benton v. Maryland 39 U.S. 784, 794-95(1969). See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937). Possibilities exist whereby the same set of conducts may violate laws of multiple
sovereigns at the same time giving rise to claims of multiple prosecutions and
punishments. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (sustaining federal
conviction following a state conviction for the same offense). See also Health v. Alabama,
474 U.S. 82 (1874) (sustaining prosecution by two states of the same defendant for the
same offense.) It is important to note from the outset that the argument presented in this
article regarding deportation as a second punishment holds true whether the prior
conviction is for violations of state law or federal law although the double jeopardy
argument might seem to be technically limited to deportation as a result of federal
convictions. The two sovereigns argument could only be valid if it is conclusively
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currently available to refugees for a complex set of reasons. The most
fundamental reason is that deportation is deemed to be a

consequence of a civil proceeding that does not necessitate
constitutional guarantees attending proceedings of a criminal nature.
Although traditionally the Double Jeopardy Clause has been
viewed as a procedural safeguard and a substantive limitation on
criminal punishments, the constitutionality of second civil punitive

sanctions has always been a subject of serious challenges. In recent
decades, the Supreme Court has expressly addressed these challenges
in a series of cases and consistently held that the Double Jeopardy

Clause does impose substantive limitations on civil sanctions that are

so punitive in nature to be considered second punishments.3
Deportation' is generally considered to be a civil sanction

Notwithstanding the jurisprudential complexities involved, this article
argues that the deportation of an already recognized refugee to a

place where he might face persecution, pursuant to the statutory
exclusion of convicted criminals, is a second punishment, and as such
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.
determined that deportation is a punishment. If that determination is made, however, the
federal government would need justification to punish, and there would be none. The
arguments presented in this article would make this proposition clearer.
3. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 114 (1963); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 20 (1979); United States v. Wade, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435 (1989); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); Department of Revenue of
Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93
(1997).
4. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
of 1996 consolidated two proceedings formerly known as "deportation" and "exclusion"
into a single proceeding called "removal". See IIRIRA Pub. L. No. 104-208, Sec. 306, 110
Stat. 3009-546, 3009-607 to 612 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1242.) Although
under existing law, the order to leave the United States is called "removal order," this
article uses the term "deportation" to signify the act of removing a person outside of the
territories of the United States pursuant to a removal order to a place where he fears
persecution. The term deportation is preferred in this article not only because it still refers
to the removal of aliens who have already been admitted, which is the focus of this article
but also better signifies the severity of the measure. For a discussion of the use of
terminology after the IIRIRA, see STEVEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY, 290-91 (2d ed. 1997).
5. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709, 730 (1893). The
objection to this view predates its adoption. For example, James Madison, in his report to
the Constitutional Convention is reported to have said: "[I]f banishment of this sort be not
a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a
doom to which the name can be applied." See Madison's Report on the Virginia
Resolutions (1800), in 4 The Debates in the Several States Conventions on the Adoption
of the Federal Constitution at 546, 555 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1987) cited in Robert Pauw, A
New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why At Least Some of the Constitution's
CriminalProcedureProtectionsMust Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, N.8 (2000).
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Several obstacles need to be overcome to ensure that the
argument is well founded in reason and constitutional jurisprudence.
With this view, the second part addresses the unique status of
different categories of aliens under the Constitution and establishes
that refugees, as a particular category of aliens, are entitled to the full
protection of the Constitution. The third part analyzes the
jurisprudence of the Double Jeopardy Clause vis-A-vis quasi-criminal
and civil proceedings and sanctions, and identifies the most
appropriate set of tests for the determination of whether a nominal
civil sanction should be considered a second punishment for purposes
of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The fourth part puts the nature and
consequences of deportation proceedings involving refugees into
perspective and argues that deportation of refugees qualifies as
punishment under the conventional jurisprudence. The fifth part
provides a brief conclusion.
H. Constitutional Protection of Aliens: Do They Benefit From
the Guarantees of the Double Jeopardy Clause?
Before a discussion of deportation of refugee criminals in light of
the existing jurisprudential definition of punishment is offered, it is
important to underscore the constitutional entitlement of different
categories of aliens including refugees. It is often stated that "[i]n the
exercise of its broad power over nationalization and immigration,
Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied
to citizens." 6 The question that must first be answered is, therefore,
to what extent are refugees entitled to the protection of the
constitution? Are they ordinarily entitled to the full protection of the
Fifth Amendment including the protection against Double Jeopardy?
To answer these questions, this part discusses the constitutional
jurisprudence pertaining to different categories of aliens and
demonstrates the place of refugees in a continuum.
A. Evolution of the Jurisprudence Relating to the Constitutional
Safeguards Accorded to Aliens

Before the Civil War, immigration to the United States was not
only free but also encouraged.7 For example, a Congressional Act
declared in 1868 provided that: "[T]he right of expatriation is a

6. See, e.g., Mathews v. Daiz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976).
7. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853,855 (1987).
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natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the

enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness;
and ... in ... recognition of this principle this government has freely

received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the right
of citizenship... ."s By 1875, however, a combination of social and
economic conditions prompted Congress to enact the first systematic
national immigration act ever. 9 Between 1882 and 1892 a series of
These acts would shape the
Chinese exclusion acts followed."

constitutional jurisprudence relating not only to the admission and
exclusion of aliens but also the constitutional entitlement of those
who had already been lawfully admitted for the century that

followed." Although the progeny still persists, that was an era "when
the Bill of Rights had not yet become our national hallmark and the
principal justification and preoccupation of judicial review."' 2
Gradually, however, the effects of the jurisprudence of the
Chinese Exclusion Era seem to be eroding. Although in the Chinese
Exclusion case, 3 the Supreme Court adopted the plenary power
doctrine, which holds that Congressional determination is "conclusive

on the judiciary,"'" the Court never said that the power to regulate
immigration is completely without constitutional constraints."
8. See An Act Concerning the Rights of American Citizens in Foreign States, ch.
249, 15 Stat. 223 (1868) cited in id. at n. 10.
9. See Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, supra note 7 at 855.
Professor Henkin suggests that some of the factors that prompted the enactment include
economic depression, unemployment, growing nativism, racism, and xenophobia. See id.
at 855-856. For a similar suggestion see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a
Century of PlenaryPower: Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation,100
YALE L.J. 545,550-551 (1990).
10. See Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, supra note 7 at 855.
11. Id. at 861. ("[in new contexts, the offspring of Chinese Exclusion still reign to
deny constitutional protection to many thousands of aliens against new indecencies.")
12. Id. at 862.
13. The case that is commonly known as the Chinese Exclusion case is Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
14. The Supreme Court's first attempt to define the federal government's power to
exclude aliens related to Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). In this
case, the respondent came to the United States as a laborer in 1875, a time when a treaty
concluded between the United States and China in 1868 seemed to have guaranteed
immigration from China without restriction. Id. at 596. In 1880, however, a supplemental
treaty allowed the United States to "regulate, limit or suspend" Chinese labor related
immigration. See id. In 1882 a complete Chinese exclusion was effected. See id. at 598-99.
The Chinese Exclusion of 1882 allowed those who were already in the United States to
obtain a certificate for reentry purposes. The respondent in this case obtained the
certificate and left the country. While attempting to reenter, however, he was told that he
was excluded pursuant to a Congressional act that denied entry to those with a certificate.
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In 1903, in what is commonly known as the Japanese immigrant
case, 16 the Court made a distinction between those seeking to get
admitted to the United States and those who had already been
admitted.17 In this case, the Court disallowed the deportation of a
Japanese immigrant who had already entered the United States on two
grounds: (1) Aliens who have already been admitted to the United
States are entitled to better constitutional safeguards than those who

Id. He challenged the constitutionality of his exclusion on two grounds of which only one
is relevant here, i.e., the 1888 exclusion act was unconstitutional because Congress lacked
competence to enact such law. Id. at 603. Justice Field, writing for the majority,
established that the federal government has an exclusive authority to regulate immigration
and that it could do so without being subjected to judicial review. Id. at 604. This was the
foundation of the plenary power doctrine which persists to this day. It is important to note
at this juncture that this was an era when due process and equal protection concepts were
in their infancy.
15. See Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, supra note 7 at 859.
Professor Henkin suggests that the Court never considered the constitutional rights of the
aliens in this case because it was not raised at all and "[t]he plausible candidate, the due
process clause, had not yet begun to flower." Id. In 1892, however, the Court rejected
challenges based on individual constitutional rights. See generally, Nishimura Eiku v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (reaffirming unlimited congressional power over
immigration). The Court also reaffirmed the same principle the following year in Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). In Ting, the Court rejected a procedural
due process claim by residents of the United States of Chinese origin. When Congress
extended Chinese exclusion in 1892 for ten more years, it allowed Chinese persons already
resident in the United States to remain; however, it required that whoever claimed to have
been in the United States before the ban took effect must demonstrate such residence by
producing "a credible white witness." See 142 U.S. at 700, n. 1, Sec. 6 ("[a]nd to the
satisfaction of the court, and by at least one credible white witness, that he was a resident
of the United States at the time of the passage of this act..."). Unable to produce "a
credible white witness," the respondents in this case argued that the requirement violated
their right to procedural due process. Id. at 713. Relying on the plenary power doctrine,
the Court held that the federal government's power in immigration is immune from
judicial review. Id. at 715.
16. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
17. Id. at 101. The Court did not, however, question the plenary power doctrine. In
fact it reiterated the doctrine more eloquently as: "That Congress may exclude aliens of a
particular race from the United States; prescribe the terms and conditions upon which
certain classes of aliens may come to this country; establish regulations for sending out of
the country such aliens as come here in violation of law; and commit the enforcement of
such provisions, conditions, and regulations exclusively to executive officers, without
judicial intervention, are principles firmly established by the decisions of this court." Id.
citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651; Lem Moon Sing v. United States,
158 U. S. 538; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, Fok Yung Yo v. United States,
185 U. S.296.
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seek to be admitted;"8 (2) Procedural due process questions must be
reviewed more carefully than pure questions of immigration law. '9
From these early cases, although rudimentary, a consistent theme
seems to emerge. (1) Congress's power to regulate immigration is
unrestricted; (2) Aliens who have already been admitted to the
territories of the United States are entitled to at least procedural due
process. The emphasis seems to be on the location of the alien and
the nature of the constitutional claim. As shown below, these two
themes play a fundamental role in today's jurisprudence relating to
the constitutional entitlement of aliens.
Even during the Chinese Exclusion era, in non-immigration
related matters, the Court has consistently held that admitted aliens
were entitled to a range of protections enshrined under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments." Evidently, developments in constitutional law
relating to individual rights and civil liberties outside of the
immigration context increasingly conflicted with the plenary power
doctrine and the progeny of Chinese Exclusion.2 Although a series of
cases decided in the early 1950s seemed to have reinvigorated the
plenary power doctrine in a very troubling way,22 in the decades that
18. See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101.
19. Id. at 100-101. (But this court has never held, nor must we now be understood as
holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving
the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in 'due
process of law' as understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. One of
these principles is that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at
some time, to be heard, before such officers, in respect of the matters upon which that
liberty depends,-not necessarily an opportunity upon a regular, set occasion, and according
to the forms of judicial procedure, but one that will secure the prompt, vigorous action
contemplated by Congress, and at the same time be appropriate to the nature of the case
upon which such officers are required to act. Therefore, it is not competent for the
Secretary of the Treasury or any executive officer, at any time within the year limited by
the statute, arbitrarily to cause an alien who has entered the country, and has become
subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged to be
illegally here, to be taken into custody and deported without giving him opportunity to be
heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United States. No
such arbitrary power can exist where the principles involved in due process of law are
recognized.).
20. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (overturning a San
Francisco law prohibiting persons of Chinese origin from operating a laundry service, held
that States may not engage in invidious discrimination against aliens inside the territories
of the United States.); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (holding that a
judicial trial is required before an alien is subjected to a criminal punishment.).
21. The nineteenth century immigration cases are, of course, the products of the era
of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
22. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughness, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (holding
that the power to exclude aliens is beyond judicial review-"Whatever the procedure
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and the individual rights

approach steadily gained some momentum. For example, in Plyler
v. Doe," the Court struck down a State statute depriving children of
undocumented immigrants from attending public school.26

It held

that even undocumented immigrants are entitled to constitutional
protection against discrimination.2 7
The Court also extended constitutional protection against
invidious discrimination to the federal realm. In Hampton v. Mow

Sun Wong,2 the Court struck down a federal regulation that made
aliens ineligible for certain types of federal employment on the
grounds that it lacked rational basis for the attainment of any
legitimate objective.29 Moreover, in Mathews v. Diaz,3° although the
Court upheld a federal law that deprived aliens of the right to

Medicare unless they had acquired permanent residency and lived in
the United States for five years, it reaffirmed the fundamental notion

authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.").
See also id. at 544; and Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 245 U.S. 206 (1953)
(holding that arriving aliens, whether they held permanent residence in the United States
or not, could be denied constitutional safeguards that might be available to aliens who are
already in the country.).
23. See, e.g., Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, supra note 7 at
860-862 ("The doctrine that the Constitution neither limits governmental control over
admission of aliens nor secures the right of admitted aliens to reside here emerged in the
oppressive shadow of a racist, nativist mood a hundred years ago. It was reaffirmed
during fearful, cold war, McCarthy days. It has no foundation in principle. It is a
constitutional fossil, a remnant of a pre-rights jurisprudence that we have proudly rejected
in other respects. Nothing in our constitution, its theory, or history warrants exempting
any exercise of governmental power from constitutional restraint. No such exemption is
required or even warranted by the fact that the power to control immigration is
unenumerated, inherent in sovereignty, and extra-constitutional.") See also Peter H.
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 CULB. L. REV. 1 (1984) reprinted in
CHIN, ROMERO, SCAPERLANDA, IMMIGRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION, THE ORIGINS

OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7ol. I, 267 (2000) ("It]he signs of incipient changes are
abundant and unmistakable. The Courts' almost complete deference to Congress and the
immigration authorities, long a keystone of classical structure, is beginning to give way to a
new understanding and rhetoric of judicial role ...
").Professor Schuck concludes that:
"Immigration is gradually rejoining the mainstream of our public law." Id. at 284.
24. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down a state
residency requirement for entitlement for welfare benefits.).
25. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
26. Id. at 219.
27. Id.
28. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
29. Id. at 114-116.
30. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).

Spring 2007]

COMMITING A CRIME WHILE A REFUGEE

391

that aliens are entitled to constitutional protection of due process."
The Diaz Court summarized that:
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of
the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons
from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law... Even those whose presence in this country is
unlawful, involuntary, or transitory are entitled to that
constitutional protection. 32
A number of decisions rendered in the early and mid-1970s held
that aliens in the territories of the United States are entitled to the
protection of the Fourth Amendment 3 although the degree of the
protection varies depending on the degree of ties they have with the
United States?'
Although the plenary power doctrine of the nineteenth century
still persists, particularly in the admission and exclusion arena, the
availability of constitutional guarantees to aliens of different
categories is currently without dispute. The significant growth of
rights based jurisprudence of the last century on the one hand, and
the persistence of the plenary power doctrine in the immigration
context on the other, did not allow a simple and coherent
constitutional immigration law to emerge. In 1985, even if the
Supreme Court had the opportunity take on the issue and reconcile
the plenary power doctrine with the growing individual rights
jurisprudence in Jean v. Nelson,35 it chose not to address the
constitutional issue prompting the dissent to suggest that it was a

31. Id. at 77-78.
32. See 426 U.S. at 78 citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51; Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238; Russian Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489.
33. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (holding that
border-patrol's warrantless search of a vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment.); see also
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (holding that a border-patrol stop
solely based on the ethnic appearance of the occupant of a vehicle violated the Fourth
Amendment.).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment applies to aliens, however, a "substantial voluntary" attachment
to the United States polity is required.).
35. 472 U.S. 846 (1985). In Nelson, a group of detained Haitian asylum seekers
claimed that the INS detention policy discriminated against them because of their race and
national origin. The Court held that the statute in question was not facially discriminatory
and as such was not necessary to decide the constitutional issue.. Id. at 852. It remanded
the case for the determination of whether the INS actually used race and country of origin
as a basis for their decision. Id. at 857.
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"disingenuous evasion."36 Currently, therefore, aliens' constitutional
guarantees depend not only on their location but also on the nature
and degree of relations they have with the polity of the United States.
The Mathews v. Diaz Court neatly summarized the complexity
involved in the contemporary jurisprudence pertaining to the
constitutional protection of aliens in the following manner:
The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected
by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further
conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages
of citizenship, or indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens must
be placed in a single homogeneous legal classification. For a
host of constitutional and statutory provisions rest on the
premise that a legitimate distinction between citizens and aliens
may justify attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to
the other; and the class of aliens is itself a heterogeneous
multitude of persons with a wide-ranging variety of ties to this
country.
No single legal authority systematically and comprehensively
addresses the nature and degree of ties that are required for the
various constitutional protections to apply to aliens. The following
section discusses the applicability of different constitutional
guarantees under different circumstances and identifies the place of
refugees in a continuum with a view to demonstrating that refugees as
a category of aliens are entitled to the full protection of the
Constitution.
B. The Current State of the Jurisprudence
When does an alien come within the protection of the
Constitution? Under existing jurisprudence, this question may best
be answered in a continuum-total alienage and citizenship being on
the extreme opposite sides of the equation. The answer to the two
extremes is simple. The Constitution does not apply to total aliens

36. See 472 U.S, at 858 (Marshal, J. and Brennan, J. dissenting).
37. See 426 U.S. at 78-79. By way of example, the Court noted that the Constitution
protects the privileges and immunities of citizens only. Amend. 14, s. 1, and, Art. IV, s 2,
cl.
1. The right to vote is preserved to citizens only. Amend. 15, 19, 24, 26. Representatives
are required to be citizens for seven years. Art. I. s 2, cl. 2 and Senators for nine years, Art.
I. s 3, cl. 3. Moreover, the president needs to be a "natural born citizen," Art. II, s 1, cl.
5.
Id. n. 12. Furthermore, many federal statutes distinguish between citizens and aliens and
in fact the whole of Title 8 of United States Code is predicated on the assumption of the
legitimacy of distinguishing between citizens and aliens. Id. at 78.
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without any contacts with the United States,38 but it applies in full
force to all citizens of the United States regardless of where they may
be.3 9 There are several categories of persons in between these two
extremes. 4 The following are some of the different categories in the
order of their relationship with the United States-the most
attenuated connection being listed first: aliens under the custody of

the United States outside of the territories of the United States,
undocumented aliens at permanent ports of entry and within a limited
range of the borders, refugees, and permanent resident aliens-the
closest immigrant status to citizenship. The extent of the applicability

of the Constitution to all of these categories of persons is a subject of

38. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318 ("[n]either the Constitution nor the laws
passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own
citizens."
39. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (2004). In Hamdi, the
Court suggested that for purposes of a writ of habeas corpus, the location of the detention
of a United States citizen does not make a "determinative constitutional difference." Id.
at 524. The petitioner in this case was detained at Guantanamo Bay but was later
transferred to a naval brig when it became clear that he was a United States citizen
prompting the Court's comment. He was classified as an "enemy combatant." The term
"enemy combatants" in current usage signifies United States citizens who "support forces
hostile to the United States or coalition partners.... and who engage in an armed conflict
against the United States." Id. at 516. This decision seems to suggest that "enemy
combatants" may have a lesser degree of constitutional protection regardless of their
citizenship status. The Court first held that: "a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his
classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a
neutral decision maker." Id. at 533. Nonetheless, the Court established a burden shifting
scheme to alleviate the government's burden of proving its allegations because of the
"uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict." Id.
at 534. The burden shifting scheme provides for a presumption in favor of the
government's evidence, including hearsay evidence, with an opportunity for the citizen
detainee to rebut that presumption. Id. at 534. Under normal circumstances, this would
seem to be a violation of the principle of presumption of innocence. See also Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). In this case, the court touched upon the issues of the
possibility of U.S. citizens detained outside of the territories of the United States to seek a
habeas remedy. It said, "As a corollary to the previously referenced exception to the
immediate custodian rule ...we have similarly relaxed the district of confinement rule
when "Americans citizens confined overseas (and thus outside the territory of any district
court) have sought relief in habeas corpus." And cited to among other cases to Burns v.
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 97 L.Ed. 1508 (1953), in which the Court allowed
court-martial convicts held in Guam to sue Secretary of Defense in the District of
Columbia); and also United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 76 S.Ct. 1, 100
L.Ed. 8 (1955), in which it approved the suit by court-martial convict held in Korea against
Secretary of the Air Force in the District of Columbia. See 542 U.S. at n. 16.
40. Non-immigrant categories covered under consular and diplomatic laws are not
discussed in this article.
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great controversy in relation to a wide range of matters.4 1'

The

following discussion puts the position of refugees in relation to other
categories of aliens into perspective.
i.

Aliens Under U.S. Custody Outside of the Territoriesof the U.S.

Perhaps the most attenuated link of jurisprudential significance
involves aliens who have never set foot on United States soil but are

under the custody of the authorities of the United States government
in territories the U.S. controls. This situation was considered by the
Supreme Court recently in Rasul v. Bush. In this case, the Court
considered whether the habeas statute43 provides for a right of judicial
review of the legality of detention of aliens by the Executive in a
territory where the U.S. does not exercise full sovereignty but an
exclusive jurisdiction. ' Answering this question in the affirmative, 5
the Court endorsed the opinion that "the reach of the writ depended
not on formal notions of territorial sovereignty, but rather on the
practical question of the extent and nature of the jurisdiction or
dominion exercised."

6

According to Rasul, therefore, aliens under

41. As pointed out in the previous sections, owing to the plenary power doctrine,
Congress's enactments distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens have, by and large,
enjoyed immunity from constitutional scrutiny. For commentaries relating to the plenary
power doctrine, see generally Louis Henkin, The Constitution and the United States
Sovereignty, supra note 7; See also Hirishi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power,supra note 9.
42. 542 U.S. 466, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 72 USLW 4596, (2004).
43. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241-2243 (2000). The habeas corpus statute provides that as
long as a custodian can be reached by service of process, courts may issue a writ within
their jurisdiction requiring that prisoner be brought before the issuing court for a hearing
on the detainee's claim, or requiring that he be released from custody, even if the prisoner
himself is confined outside the court's territorial jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(a).
44. See 542 U.S. at 475. The petitioners in this case were two Australian and twelve
Kuwati citizens who were captured during hostilities in Afghanistan and were placed
under the custody of United States authorities at Guantanamo Bay along with
approximately 640 non-US citizens. Id. at 470-471. Although the United States does not
exercise full sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay, which comprises 45 square miles of
territory, it has an exclusive leasehold right pursuant to an agreement signed with Cuba in
1903 and later modified in 1934. Id. at 471. According the agreement, the United States'
leasehold right remains in effect "as long as the United States of America shall not
abandon" it. Id. Cuba gets a thousand dollars per annum in exchange. Id.
45. See 542 U.S. at 485.
46. The Court cited to Lord Mansfield's 1759 opinion. Quoting the opinion in King v.
Cowle, the Court stated: "even if a territory was no part of the realm" there was "no
doubt" as the court's power to issue writs of habeas corpus if the territory was "under the
subjection of the Crown." King v. Cowle, 2 Burr. 834, 854-855, 97 Eng. Rep. 587, 598-599
(K.B.) cited in 542 U.S. at 482. The Court added that historically "courts exercised habeas
jurisdiction over the claims of aliens detained within the sovereign territory of the realm,
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United States custody in a territory where the United States exercises
exclusive control may petition for habeas corpus47 in federal courts
with jurisdiction over the custodian. 4 Hence, at a minimum, persons

under United States custody in a territory where the United States
exercises jurisdiction are entitled to a certain degree of constitutional
due process. As shown in the following subsections, the level of

protection increases with the degree of contacts with the United
States.
ii.

Undocumented Aliens at PermanentPorts of Entry

As indicated in section II (a) supra, more than a century of
jurisprudence holds that certain protections that the Constitution
accords to individuals may extend to undocumented aliens within the

territories of the United States. 49 However, severe restrictions apply
as well as the claims of persons detained in the so-called "exempt jurisdiction" where
ordinary writs did not run, and other dominions under the sovereign control." (footnote
omitted). See 542 U.S. at 482. The Court also determined that in the early days of the
Republic, United States courts also followed a similar practice. It relied on three
eighteenth century cases: United States v. Villato, 2 Dall. 370, 1 L.Ed. 419 (CC Pa. 1797)
(granting habeas relief to a Spanish-born prisoner charged with treason on the ground that
he had never become a citizen of the United States); Ex Parte D'Olivera, 7 F. Cas. 853
(No, 3,967) (CC Mass. 1813) (Story, J. in circuit) (ordering the release of Portuguese
sailors arrested for deserting their ship); Wilson v. Izard, 30 F. Cas. 131 (No. 17, 810) (CC
N.Y. 1815) (Livingston, J., on circuit) (reviewing the habeas petition of enlistees who
claimed that they were entitled to discharge because of their status as enemy aliens.) all
cited in 542 U.S. at n. 11.
47. "Petitioners' allegations-that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor
in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in Executive detention
for more than two years in territories subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and
control of the United States, without access to counsel and without being charged with any
wrong doing-unquestionably describe "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States." See 542 U.S. at 384 n.15 (citations omitted).
48. In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, the Supreme Court offered procedural guidance relating
jurisdictional issues. 542 U.S. 426, n.16 (2004). There is no suggestion that the procedural
guidance is limited to suits filed by U.S. citizens. Padilla was essentially a jurisdictional
case. The Court held that the proper defendant for a habeas petition is not the Secretary
of Defense but the immediate custodian. Id. at 447. Avoidance of forum shopping was
the most important policy consideration for the Court.
49. As far back as 1896, the Supreme Court held that undocumented immigrants are
entitled to constitutional protection. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238
(1896) (holding that the protection enshrined under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
apply to undocumented immigrants within the United States.) See also Plyer v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (holding that aliens are protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments) see also Matthews v. Daiz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment protects undocumented immigrants from invidious
discrimination.). See also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (assumes that the
Fourth Amendment applies to undocumented immigrants but holds that certain
protections do not apply.). See also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
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Statutes and case

law regularly treated persons who managed to enter the country,
regardless of their illegal entry, more favorably than those whose
attempt to enter is unsuccessful." Because of this long-standing
distinction, some constitutional protections are not available to
certain class of immigrants who seek admission into the United
States.52

272-73 (1990) (adding more requirements for entitlement to the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment, i.e., voluntary presence in the territories of the United States and requiring
substantial connections.). For commentary, see, e.g., James G. Connell, III & Rene L.
Valladares, Search and Seizure Protectionfor Undocumented Aliens: The Territorialityand
Voluntary Presence Principles in Fourth Amendment Law, 34 AM. CRIM. L.REV. 1293
(1997); Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional
Community, 81 Iowa L. Rev. (19960 reprinted in CHIN, ROMERO, SCAPERLANDA,
IMMIGRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION, DISCRIMINATION AND EQUALITY IN
CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION LAW, VOL. 2,101-167 (2000).
50. The Commerce Clause is deemed to be the primary source of authority for the
Federal Government to conducts searches and seizures at the borders. U.S. Const. art. I,
s. 8, cl. 3. Courts have recognized this authority in a wide variety of contexts, see, e.g.,
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); see also United States v. Montoya
De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1985). The power to search based upon suspicion
less than probable cause or perhaps no cause at all maybe conducted at places that are
considered to be the "functional equivalent" of entry ports or borders. See AlmeidaSanchez v. U.S., 413 U.S. at 272. Several Circuit Courts have expanded the concept to
include, among other places, first detention centers, see, e.g., United States v. Emmens,
893 F. 2d 1292, 1294095 (5th Cir. 1990).
51. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Center Council, Inc., 596 U.S. 155, 175 (1993) ("[O]ur
immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens who have come to our
shores seeking admission, such as petitioner, and those who are within the United States
after entry, irrespective of its illegality.").
52. The distinction persisted after the enactment in 1996 of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), and IIRIRA. However, different labels
were given to different procedures with questionable constitutional implications. For
example, the category of persons formerly known as "excludable," and "deportable" were
replaced with the term "inadmissible aliens." The later is broader because it includes not
only those detained while attempting to enter without valid credentials (excludable) but
also those who have already entered illegally (deportable). Those who have entered
legally are called admitted aliens regardless of their subsequent status as legal or illegal.
See generally, IIRIRA, supra note 4. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the
constitutional issue of the due process right applicable to the new category of
"inadmissible" aliens. The Circuit Courts of Appeal are split on this issue. For example,
in Gonzales v. Reno, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected a due process
claim for asylum by an inadmissible alien. See 215 F. 2d 957 (11th Cir. 2000). Other circuit
courts have upheld the due process rights of the category of persons formerly known as
"excludables" who would constitute a part of "inadmissibles" in current parlance. See,
e.g., Augustin v. Sava, 735 F. 2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984); Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F. 3d 195 (3d Cir.
1996); Selgeka v. Carroll, 184 F. 3d 337 (4th Cir. 1999). The IIRIRA does not change the
fundamental jurisprudential split in any concrete manner.
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For example, while government officials may stop vehicles and
conduct questionings at permanent checkpoints without a probable
cause of individualized wrongdoing,53 other types of border patrols
are presumably subject to the "reasonable suspicion" standard."
The inapplicability of certain constitutional principles to certain
categories of immigrants may, however, take a more subtle form. For
55 the Supreme Court
example, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
held that INS patrol agents may stop a vehicle in places other than
permanent checkpoints only if there are: "specific articulable facts,

together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably
warrant suspicion that the vehicle contains aliens. '5 6 Measures other
than brief inspections for the presence of undocumented immigrants

must be based on probable cause.57 The Court further articulated
factors that might be taken into account in forming a probable cause.
They include:

The nature of the area where

the vehicle is

encountered; its proximity to the border; the officer's experience in
dealing with illegal border crossings; the driver's conduct; and the

physical situations of the vehicle, the passengers' appearance and the
pattern of the traffic. 58 The Court acknowledged that the person's

ethnic appearance is a relevant factor in forming a reasonable
suspicion.59 Nonetheless, the Court made it clear that a stop based
solely on the person's ethnic appearance is unconstitutional.'
Another example is the Supreme Court's decision in INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza.61 In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court held that the
exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment does not apply in

53. See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (holding that probable cause is not
required at permanent checkpoints.).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 833 (1975).
55. 422 U.S. 873, 833 (1975).
56. Id. at 844.
57. Id. at 881-882.
58. Id. at 884-885.
59. See id. at 886-87. The Court said that even if there is a high likelihood that a
Hispanic appearing person might be an undocumented immigrant, standing alone, it does
not justify stopping "all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are illegal aliens." Id. As such
courts must consider the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 885.
60. Id. However, some recent decisions appear to undermine Brignoni-Ponce's
prohibition against race-based profiling. See, e.g., Habeeb v. Castloo, 434 F. Supp. 2d 899
(D.Mont., 2006) (holding that an officer's reliance on appearance or ethnicity in making
law enforcement related stops without more does not constitute a constitutional
violation.).
61. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
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deportation proceedings.62 In this case, the respondents challenged

the admissibility of evidence obtained because of their arrest in
violation of the fourth Amendment right.63 The Court characterized
deportation proceedings as "purely civil" and held that the
exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation proceedings. 64 The
Court applied the balancing test employed under United States v.
Janis,65 and concluded that the social cost of exclusion of illegally

obtained evidence in deportation proceedings outweighs the benefit
of deterrence. 6 It enumerated four specific reasons in support of this
conclusion: (1) Deportability could be ascertained by evidence other
than those obtained through illegal arrest,67 (2) very few, if any, illegal
immigrants actually challenge deportation orders based on the Fourth

Amendment,' (3) the INS already had its own scheme of deterrence, 69
(4) the availability of civil and criminal sanctions against the agent is a
sufficient deterrence. 70
On the benefits side, the Court noted that excluding such
evidence would require courts "to close their eyes to on going
violations of the law."7 It would also have the effect of unduly
complicating the deportation system and also that it would severely
burden the administration of the immigration laws.72

However, the Court did not leave its decision as categorical as it
appears, it expressly noted that the decision did not, by any means,
include cases where there is "good reason to believe that Fourth
Amendment violations by INS officials were widespread ' , 73 and
62. Id.
63. See 468 U.S. at 1034-35. INS agents made an unauthorized entry into a store against
the store owner's objection and arrested Lopez-Mendoza and Sanchez-Sandoval. Id. Upon
questioning, they both admitted their illegal presence in the U.S. Id. at 1035-1037.
64. Id. at 1038.
65. 428 U.S. 433 (1976) In Janis, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) used evidence
that state officials obtained illegally. The Court applied a cost-benefit analysis and held
that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in civil proceedings because the social cost of
exclusion of valuable evidence outweighs the benefits of deterrence. Id. at 454.
66. See 468 U.S. at 1041-50. Justices Brennan and White argued that the Court's
reliance on the Janis cost-benefit analysis was misplaced. Id. at 1050-60. (White-Brennan,
J. dissenting).
67. See 468 U.S. at 1043.
68. Id. at 1044.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1045.
71. Id. at 1046.
72. Id. at 1049.
73. Id. at 1050.
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further noted that the decision in this case did not deal with
''egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that
might transgress notions of fundamental fairness
and undermine the
74

probative value of the evidence obtained."
In Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS,75 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied Lopez-Mendoza's "egregious violations" exception to a racebased border patrol stop and held that the race-based stop triggered
the application of the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment. 6

In this case, the arresting officer testified that he stopped the vehicle
because of the Hispanic appearance of the passengers, among other

factors7 7 The court held that race-based stop is an egregious violation
of the Fourth Amendment that warrants the exclusion of all evidence
obtained because of the violation at the deportation proceeding.
iii. Refugees
The above two subsections discussed the degree of constitutional

guarantees available to aliens with substantially lesser connections
with the polity of the United States. This subsection discusses the
degree of constitutional guarantees that are available for the specific
class of aliens known as refugees. The discussion of the constitutional

protection of refugees necessarily involves a discussion of the origins
of the protections that are international in nature. This subsection
makes a one paragraph digression to provide a background on the

international underpinnings of the constitutional rights of refugees.
As indicated above, refugees are a specific category of aliens
with specific entitlements.
These entitlements emanate from

74. Id. at 1050-51. Although, this part of the Court's decision is considered dictum, it
is perhaps the most significant aspect of the decision. The decision in general is a plurality
opinion. This segment of the decision is arguably endorsed by all justices except Chief
Justice Burger.
75. See 22 F. 3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994).
76. Id. at 1448-52.
77. The arresting officer testified that he generally stops vehicles when passengers
appeared Hispanic and showed nervousness. In this case, he said that he stopped two
Hispanic men, father and son, because of five reasons: (1) their Hispanic appearance, (2)
their failure to acknowledge the presence of the patrol car, (3) one of the passenger's dry
mouth, (4) excessive blinking of one of them, (5) the nervous appearance of both of them.
Id. at 1443.
78. Id. at 1452. For scholarly commentary, see generally, Victor Romero, The
Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Undocumented Immigrants: Guitterez and the Tort
Law! Immigration Law Parallel,35 HARV. C.R. -C.L.L. REV. 57, 65 (2000) (arguing that
whenever Fourth Amendment issues arise courts should place less emphasis on the
immigration status of the involved individual.).
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international law. Although refugee protection has ancient origins,"
the international law relating to the protect refugees took its current
structure with the ratification in 1951 of the Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees.' Initially Eurocentric and temporally limited
to events that took place prior to its ratification, this Convention
gained universalism after the ratification of the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, which the United States adhered
8
to.
To bring the United States into compliance with the 1967 United
Nations Refugee Protocol,82 Congress enacted the 1980 Refugee Act.83
The Protocol is a result of post-World War II human rights era.' As
such, it could rightfully be classified as a human rights instrument.8 5
Evidently, the 1980 Refugee Act has incorporated the important parts
of this human rights instrument with insignificant modifications.
Refugees86 are, therefore, a special category of persons whose
79. See ATEL GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, VOL I. 9 (1966) and see also extracts in KAREN MUSALO, REFUGEE LAW AND

POLICY (2002), 3-11. For a comprehensive discussion of the background, see generally,
PAUL WEIS, THE REFUGEE CONVENTION OF 1951, COMMENTARY (1995) I

-IX.

80. See generally, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: 189 UNTS 150,
entry into force: 22 April 1954. [Hereinafter the Refugee Convention].
81. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T 6223; 606
U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force Oct. 4, 1967. It is an independent legal instrument that
incorporates the 1951 Refugee Convention by reference. States could be parties to either
or both instruments. The United States, for instance, is a party only to the Protocol.
82. See INS v. Cardoza-Fanseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987).
83. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). Codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.
84. For example, in 1948, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
declared: "Every one has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution." See UDHR, GA re. 217(A)(III), UN Doc. A/810 (1948) at art. 14.
85. See, e.g., JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 2-5 (1992)
(arguing that international refugee instruments adopted after World War II emphasized
the individual rights approach.)
86. The Refugee Convention, which Refugee Protocol incorporated, defines a
refugee as a person who: "owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
out side the country of his nationality and is unable, or unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being out side the country
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear
unwilling to return to it." Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: 189 UNTS 150,
entry into force: 22 April 1954. at 1(A) (2). It is generally understood that recognition of
one's refugee status does not make him or her a refugee but declares him or her a refugee.
As such, the fact of being a refugee necessarily comes before recognition. Recognition is
therefore declaratory not constitutive. See United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Procedure and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
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protection is sanctioned by an international treaty which makes part
of the laws of the United States. Accordingly, they are entitled to
dual protection: Whatever protection they are entitled to under the
Constitution as ordinary aliens within the territories as well as special

protection under the 1980 Refugee Act.
The most fundamental protection of refugees under the 1980
Refugee Act is the mandatory prohibition against deportation to a
place where they would be persecuted.' Under the Act, once refugees
are recognized, they are entitled to a number of benefits that are

designed to integrate them into the United States society.' These
benefits include authorization to work, entitlement to travel abroad
and reenter the United States, 9 family reunion,' and also adjustment

to that of lawful permanent resident after a year of residency
following the grant of asylum which may be backdated to the time of
The permanent residency status entitles refugees to
arrival.91

citizenship after meeting the residency requirement.
Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 Reedited January 1992, UNHCR 1979. at Para. 28. The
Refugee Act adopted the definition with minor modifications. See INA Sec. 101(a)(42), 8
U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(42). Refugees could be recognized by the United States through two
distinct procedures: the Overseas Refugee Program pursuant to INA Sec. 207, 8 U.S.C.
Sec. 1157, and through Political Asylum Procedures in the territories of the United States
pursuant to INA Sec. 208, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1158. Both procedures use the same definition of
a refugee but differ in many respects. For a concise discussion of the two procedures, see
MUSALO, supra note 79 at 66-82.
87. See INA Sec. 243(h)(1) (8 U.S.C. 1253) ("The Attorney General shall not deport
or return any alien (other than an alien described in section 241(a)(19)// 8 U.S.C 1251/ to
a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion." In two seminal cases, the Supreme Court
defined the different standards of proof that are required for the grant of asylum under
section 208 and the grant of withholding of removal under section 243(h). See INS v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984); INS v. Carodoza-Fonseca. 480 U.S 421, 439 (1987).
88. See Sec. 101 of the Refugee Act of 1980 at (b) H 8 U.S.C. 1521. Under purpose, it
states: "The objectives of this Act are to provide a permanent and systematic procedure
for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United
States, and to provide comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement
and absorption of those refugees who are admitted." (emphasis added).
89. See 8 U.S.C. 1158 (c)(1)("In the case of an alien granted asylum under subsection
(b) of this section, the Attorney General-(B) shall authorize the alien to engage in
employment in the United States and provide the alien with appropriate endorsement of
that authorization ; and (C) may allow the alien to travel abroad with the prior consent of
the Attorney General.")
90. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. Sec. 207.7(d) (2005) (providing that an admitted refugee may
be joined by his wife and children.).
91. See 8 U.S.C. 1159 (a)(1)(A-C), (2). ("(a) Criteria and procedures applicable for
admission as immigrant; effect of adjustment (1) Any alien who has been admitted to the
United States under section 1157 of this title-(A) whose admission has not been
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As indicated above, these are conscious efforts designed by the

Refugee Act of 1980 to integrate refugees into the United States
community. These measures are indeed sufficient to offer any
refugee the required level of substantial relations for the Fourth
Amendment and all other constitutional protections to apply.' It
could fairly be concluded that recognized refugees are almost always

entitled to near complete 9constitutional
protection as members of the
3
United States community.

Regardless of such integration objective, however, a number of
exceptions

apply

to

the mandatory

rule

of

withholding

of

deportation.'
The following exception is the most relevant for
purposes of this article. It states that refugee protection does not
apply "[t]o any alien if the Attorney General determines that ... the

alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United
States."95 This provision is taken verbatim from the Refugee
Convention.96 Although it seems to have been originally designed for

purposes of exclusion from admission or recognition under the 1951
Refugee Convention, it can also be used as a ground for termination

terminated by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General pursuant to
such regulations as the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may
prescribe, (B) who has been physically present in the United States for at least one year,
and (C) who has not acquired permanent resident status, shall, at the end of such year
period, return or be returned to the custody of the Department of Homeland Security for
inspection and examination for admission to the United States as an immigrant in
accordance with the provisions of sections 1225, 1229a, and 1231 of this title. (2) Any alien
who is found upon inspection and examination by an immigration officer pursuant to
paragraph (1) or after a hearing before an immigration judge to be admissible (except as
otherwise provided under subsection (c) of this section) as an immigrant under this
chapter at the time of the alien's inspection and examination shall, notwithstanding any
numerical limitation specified in this chapter, be regarded as lawfully admitted to the
United States for permanent residence as of the date of such alien's arrival into the United
States.").
92. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that an alien
needs to have a voluntary association with and substantial relations with the polity of the
United States for the Fourth Amendment to apply.).
93. See, e.g., Alexander Aleinikoff, The United States Constitution in its Third
Century: Foreign Affairs: Rights Here and There: Federal Regulation of Aliens and the
Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862 (1989).
94. See, e.g., INA Sec. 241(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. 1251 new section 1227 (listing deportable
grounds).
95. See INA Sec. 243(h)(2). 8 U.S.C. 1253.
96. See The Refugee Convention, supra note 80 at art. 33 (2).
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of refugee or asylum status for crimes committed after the status97 has
been granted under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
In 1990 Congress amended the INA and provided that
"aggravated felonies" are per se "particularly serious crimes" within
the meaning of the Refugee Act. 9s Congress further elaborated the
list of "aggravated felonies" under the IIRIRA in 1996.' Currently,
crimes such as theft and perjury are sufficient to cause the

deportation of a refugee provided that the term of sentence is more
than a year even if the sentence is suspended."° The possibility of
deportation to a place where refugees would face persecution because

of the commission of crimes such as these stands out to be the most
serious limitation of refugee status. As this article asks, the question
remains whether it could be reconciled with the notion of refugee
protection and also the protection against Double Jeopardy. Before
this fundamental question is discussed, for the sake of comparison

and exhaustion of the issues in the continuum, it is important to
consider the constitutional protection issues pertaining to one more
category of persons who presumably have better communal relations
97. See 8 USC 1158 (c)(2)(B) "Asylum may be terminated if the alien meets a
condition described in subsection (b)(2) of this section )" Sub-section (b) (2) states that
asylum status shall not be granted to alien "[i]f the Attorney General determines that-0)
the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any
person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion; (ii) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States; (iii)
there are serious reasons for believing that the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical
crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States; (iv)
there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the
United States ... " 8 U.S.C. 1158 (b)(2). Under special rules aggravated felonies are
considered particularly serious crimes per se. The special rules state: "Conviction of
aggravated felony - For purposes of clause (ii) of subparagraph (A), an alien who has been
convicted of an aggravated felony shall be considered to have been convicted of a
particularly serious crime." 8 U.S.C 1158 (b)(2)(B)(i). The BIA has recently held that a
separate termination proceeding is not required. See In Re Sejid Smriko, 23 I. & N. Dec.
836, 840, Interim Decision (BIA) 3520, 2005 WI 3075402 (BIA) (2005) ("[A] refugee
admitted as a lawful permanent resident... is not immunized from the grounds for
removal that are applicable to all other aliens.") (Also holding that "The consistent
reference to any alien in the statutory provisions governing removal proceedings and the
luck of mention of prior termination of refugee status are strong indications that aliens
admitted as refugees are subject to removal proceedings without the preliminary step of
terminating refugee status under Section 207(c)(4).") See id. at 838.
98. See INA Sec. 101(a)(430, INA Sec. 243(h).
99. See INA Sec. 101(a)(43).
100. See, e.g., INA Sec. 101(a)(43)(G) ("A theft offense (including receipt of stolen
property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment imposed (regardless of
any suspension of such imprisonment) is at least 1 year.").
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with the United States, but who may potentially fall within the class
of persons who could lose their refugee status and be deported to
places where they may be persecuted.
iv.

Lawful PermanentResidents

Lawful permanent residence (LPR) status is the closest
immigration status to citizenship.' °' It could invariably lead to
citizenship status after a certain number of years depending on the
manner of acquisition of the status. Although immigrants with LPR
status have significantly better rights than all other immigration status
holders, they do not have all the privileges of citizenship status."' The
two most notable limitations other than political rights are: (1) the
possibility of deportation for commission of a designated class of
crimes, and (2) the uncertainty surrounding their rights outside of the
territories of the United States. They are discussed below.
The law that provides for the deportation of non-citizen felons
does not provide any privileged status to those holding LPR status
regardless of their eligibility for citizenship and the number of years
they have held such a status. 3 With respect to the status of LPRs and
refugees that have adjusted their status to that of LPR the BIA has
recently held that: "[a] refugee who whose status has been adjusted to
that of a lawful permanent resident is subject to all applicable
grounds for removal and to placement in removal proceedings. This
has long been the accepted understanding of the immigration law. ' ' 4
As far as deportation for commission of felonies is concerned, all noncitizens are treated the same. Refugees who have adjusted to that of
LPR Status are no exception.
The uncertainty about the extent of the applicability of the
Constitution and laws of the United States with respect to LPRs
temporarily outside the territories of the United States is a result of
101. See, e.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (holding that the
reference "person" under the Fifth Amendment includes LPRs.); see also Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (holding that LPRs are entitled to the First Amendment right
without any restrictions.) and see also United States v. Verdugo-Urqidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to aliens with substantial connections
with the United States.).
102.

See Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship? 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 279 (1994)

(arguing that for purposes of municipal legislation, the citizen/non-citizen dichotomy
should be made unnecessary.).
103.

See, e.g., INA Sec. 101(a)(43).

104. See In Re Smriko, 23 I. & N. Dec. 836, 841 (BIA 2005) citing to Matter of Bahta,
22 I &N Dec. 1381, 1382 n.2 (BIA 2000); Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray. 19 I&N Dec. 407
(BIA 1986).
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the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.

In this case, the Supreme Court said that certain provision may apply
to certain situations while others may not. 6 At issue in this case was
the applicability of the Fourth Amendment for an unauthorized
search conducted by U.S. officials in Mexico.1 O The respondent was
later transferred to the U.S. and was put on trial for drug smuggling
offenses. He objected to the admissibility of the evidence obtained
during the unauthorized search at his Mexico home.1" The Court

held that constitutional protection extends only to those who are in
the United States voluntarily and can demonstrate a "substantial
connection" with the United States community."l
The Court
expressly recognized that the Fourth Amendment applied only within
the United States territories.11 The Court, however, made a clear
distinction between the texts of the Fifth and the Sixth Amendments
which use the term "person" and the "accused" respectively, and the
Fourth Amendment which uses the term "people."''
According to
the Court, the term "people" was deliberately used to signify "a class

of persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be

105. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
106. Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion holds that the Fourth Amendment's
application extends to a more limited category of persons than the First, Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. Id. at 265-66. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The rights of the people
to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The Fifth Amendment
provides: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of his life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. U.S. Const. Amend. V. The
Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature of and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witness against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. Amend VI.
107. See 494 U.S. at 274-75.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 271.
110. Id. at 266.
111. Id. at 265.
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considered part of the community."
The Supreme Court never
defined the set of circumstances that might meet the "substantial
connection" standard for purposes of inclusion into the "people"
category.
In United States v. Barona,"3 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit suggested who might be considered the "people" under
Verdugo-Urquidez's test. Judge Wallace, whose dissenting opinion in
Verdugo-Urquidez was adopted by the plurality of the Supreme
Court said that he would consider two categories of persons to be
included in the "people. 11 4 They are: (1) American citizens wherever
they may be, and (2) LPRs within the United States."' That left the
question whether immigrants with an LPR status but who are
temporarily outside the United States could be considered part of the
"people" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 6
Except for this particular question, there seems to be no doubt
that, refugees who have adjusted to that of LPR status, are
considered to fall under the "people" category. There is also little
doubt that most admitted refugees who have not adjusted to that of
LPR status would have the "sufficient connection" by virtue of their
lawful existence and promises made to them under the laws discussed
above. Perhaps by the time they integrate into society and have the
misfortune to commit a crime, they must have developed real
connections with the community and expectations to be treated just
like one of such members who happened to commit a crime. " '

112. Id.
113. 56 F. 3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1995).
114. See 56 F. 3d. at 1094.
115. Id.
116. Id. See also Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F. 2d at 1234. In at least one vacated case, a
District Court held that twelve years of illegal presence was not sufficient to establish the
required sufficient connections for the Fourth Amendment to apply. See United States v.
Guitterez, No. CR 96-40075 SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997),
cited in Victor Romero, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Undocumented
Immigrants, supra note 78 at 65. The defendant in this case had lived and worked in the
U.S. for more than ten years, had a California drivers license, was married to a permanent
resident, and also had a U.S. citizen child. Id. at 70. This decision was, however, vacated
on the court's own motion. Id. at 61
117. An empirical survey of immigrants and their involvement in crimes in North
America, Europe, and Australia sponsored by the Canadian Ministry of Citizenship and
Immigration concluded that the United States, Canada, and Australia, the criminality of
first generation immigrants is less than the native born population. However, the study
noted a much higher delinquency rate for second and third-generation immigrants. It
associates this phenomenon of increasing delinquency to among other factors to poverty,
cultural marginalization, and racism. See generally, Mathew G. Yeager, Immigrants and
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Therefore, their lawful residence, the particular privileges under
international law and national legislation discussed above coupled
with their reasonable expectation of being treated just like any
member of the community would make them part of "the people" for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
If refugees are entitled to the full protection of the Fifth
Amendment, including the privilege against Double Jeopardy, the
next question that needs to be considered is whether or not the
Double Jeopardy Clause applies outside of the context of criminal
punishment or sanctions. The next part considers this issue in some
detail.
I. The Prohibition Against Double Jeopardy:
Does It Apply to Non-criminal Proceedings?
It is currently very well-settled that the Double Jeopardy Clause

of the Fifth Amendment protects persons from three distinct types of
government abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal; (2) second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction; (3) multiple punishments for the same offense."'

Criminality: A Meta Survey (January 1996) available at http://www.cyberus.ca/-myeager/
art-l.htm.
118. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.
2d 656 (1969); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 2264, 65 L.Ed. 2d 228
(1980); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-499, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 2540, 81 L.Ed. 2d 425
(1984); United Stats v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897, 104 L.Ed. 487, 57
USLW 4526, Med & Med GD (CCH) p 37, 847. (1989). A notable objection to the
prohibition of multiple punishments comes from Justice Scalia. In his dissenting opinion
in Kurth Ranch, Justice Scalia argued that "multiple punishments" is not a component of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. He said that "To be put in jeopardy" does not remotely
mean "to be punished," so, by its terms this provision prohibits, not multiple punishments,
but multiple prosecutions." Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, et. al.
511 U.S. 767, 796, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1955, 62 USLW 4429, 73 A.F.T.R. 2d 94-2140. (1994).
However, this view remains to be a minority view without a significant support. Although
the text says harms to life or limb, the Supreme Court has consistently held that it applied
to imprisonment and monetary sanctions. See, e.g., Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall 163, 21 1.Ed.
872 (1874); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 l.Ed. 487 (1989);
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937 (1994).
These prohibitions do not extend to successive prosecutions by different sovereigns based
on the same conduct. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L. Ed. 2d
684 (1959) (allowing state prosecution following a federal prosecution based on the same
events); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L. Ed. 729 (1959) (allowing
federal prosecution following a state prosecution based on the same events.).
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More than one hundred years of jurisprudence holds that
deportation proceedings are not criminal proceedings." 9 As such,
there is little controversy regarding the nature of the proceedings.
The controversy, however, relates to the nature of the sanction
resulting from these proceedings, namely, deportation. Although it is
very difficult to find a coherent guidance regarding the evaluation of
the nature and consequences of deportation, currently the
immigration system operates under the assumption that deportation
is a civil sanction immune from constitutional concerns relating to
multiple punishments for the same offense. The most important
question that needs to be answered is thus whether the assumption
that deportation of refugees who commit crimes after their admission
is a civil sanction is correct.
For decades, courts have struggled to draw a line between civil
sanctions and outright criminal punishments. Perhaps the Supreme
Court's most comprehensive analysis of current importance relating
to the nature of sanctions is offered in its 1963 decision in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez.2 °

In Mendoza, the Court employed a multi-

pronged test to determine whether a Congressional Act was penal or
regulatory, which include: (1) whether the sanction involves an
affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been
regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it is imposed only on a finding
of scienter; (4) whether its imposition promotes the traditional
objectives of punishment i.e., retribution and deterrence; (5) whether
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an
alternative purpose could rationally be assigned to it, and (7) whether
it appears to be excessive in relation to the supposed alternative
purpose. 121

The court concluded that these factors need to be applied
"absent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal
nature of a statute' ' 122 or even if the label
is civil, to determine if the
123
act is so punitive as to negate the label.
At issue in this case was the constitutionality of a federal statute
authorizing the loss of citizenship for departing the United States for

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709. 730 (1893).
372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed. 2d 644 (1963).
See 372 U.S. at 168-169.
Id. at 169.
Id.
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the purpose of evading military service.2 4 Mendoza-Martinez, a U.S.
citizen by birth, admitted to having gone to Mexico for the sole
purpose of evading military service."5 He pled guilty to violating the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940'26 and was sentenced to a
prison term of one year and one day, which he served.' Five years
later, he was served with a warrant of arrest in deportation
proceedings on the allegation that by evading service, he had lost his
U.S. citizenship under Section 4010) of the INA."l He challenged the
constitutionality of the dual sanctions on several grounds. Relevant
for purposes of this article is the Court's inquiry regarding multiple
punishments for the same offense. Mendoza argued that the statute
that provided for the forfeiture of citizenship without the procedural
guarantees of the Fifth as well as the Sixth Amendments was
unconstitutional.129 The Court did not find it difficult to rule in his
favor because it found a clear Congressional intent to punish."'° In
determining that the statute was punitive enough to warrant the
procedural guarantees of the constitution, the Court relied on the
legislative history rather than the seven factors it enumerated. It
simply found it unnecessary to apply the seven factors. It found that
"Congress plainly employed the sanction of deprivation of nationality
as a punishment."''
The Supreme Court did not revisit the same issue until twenty
years later. In United States v. Ward,32 the Court considered a state
statute in light of the seven Mendoza factors. From the outset, the
Court said that whether a statutorily defined penalty is civil or
criminal is primarily a matter of statutory construction.' Hence, the
124. See Sec. 401(i) of the Nationality Act of 1940, added in 1944, 58 Stat. 746 cited in
372 U.S. at 145 (1963). ("A person who is a national of the United States, whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by .. (j) Departing from or remaining
outside of the jurisdiction of the United States in time of war or during a period declared
by the President to be a period of national emergency for purposes of evading or avoiding
training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States.").
125. 372 U.S. 147 (1963).
126. 54 Stat. 894, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App (1946 ed.) s. 311, cited in 372 U.S. 147
(1963).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 165.
130. Id. at 160.
131. Id. at 165.
132. United State v. L.O. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.ED. 2d 742, 14
ERC 1673, 10 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,477 (1980).
133. See U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.
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inquiry must have two distinct steps: (1) whether, in establishing the
penalizing scheme, Congress intended a preference for the civil or
criminal label; and (2) where it is clear that Congress has intended a
civil penalty scheme, the inquiry must focus on whether such a
scheme is ' "so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that
intention. '
At issue in Ward was whether the assessment of a "civil penalty"
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) qualifies
for protection under the Fifth Amendment which guarantees the right
against self-incrimination.'35

The Court held that Congress had

clearly intended to label the statute as "civil" and also that the
application of the Mendoza factors did not provide the "clearest
proof" that the penalty here in question is punitive either in effect or
in purpose."'' 6
In United States v. Halper,37 the Supreme Court considered the

issue of whether and under what circumstances that a civil penalty
qualifies as a punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
clause.'3 8 In this case, the respondent was found guilty of sixty-five

134. Id. at 248-249.
135. Id. at 244. The Statute provides in pertinent part that: "Any person in charge of a
vessel or an onshore facility or an offshore facility shall as soon as he has knowledge of
any discharge of oil or a hazardous substance from such vessel or facility in violation of
paragraph (3) of this subsection, immediately notify the appropriate agency of the United
States Government of such discharge. Any such person who fails to notify immediately
such agency of such discharge shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both." 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1321 (b)(5) cited in id.
136. See id. at 250. The District Court as well as the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit had come to a different conclusion. See id. The Court also held that it is also not
quasi-criminal under Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886).
Id. at 251. Boyd holds that "suits for penalties and forfeitures, incurred by the commission
of offenses against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature, we think they are within the
reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the fourth amendment of the
constitution, and of that portion of the fifth amendment which declares that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Boyd v. U.S. 116
U.S. at 634.
137. 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed. 2d 487, 57 USLW 4526, Med & Med GD
(CCH) p 37, 847 (1989).
138. See 490 U.S. at 441. The Court reiterated that the Double Jeopardy Clause
protects against three distinct types of abuses. A second prosecution after acquittal, a
second prosecution after conviction and most importantly multiple punishments for the
same offense. See id. at 440. In support of its conclusions regarding the multiple
punishments, the Court said that: "The third of these protections-the one at issue herehas deep roots in our history and jurisprudence. As early as 1641, the colony of
Massachusetts in its 'Body of Liberties' stated: 'No man shall be twice sentenced by Civil
Justice for one and the same Crime, Offence, or Trespasse."' American Historical
Documents 1000-1904, 43 Harvard Classics 66, 72 (C. Eliot ed. 1910) cited in id. at 440.
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counts of false medical claims under the Criminal False Claims
Statute'39 and sixteen counts of mail fraud.'

He was sentenced to

imprisonment of two years and a fine of $5,000.'' Thereafter, the
government brought a civil action pursuant to the Civil False Claims
2

Act

based on the same set of facts that warranted the criminal

conviction.'43 The Act prescribed remedy per violation.' 4 Having
caused sixty-five different violations, Halper was said to have been

subject to a penalty of $130,000.14' The over-payment because of
Halper's criminal conduct was only $585. 146
The Court then considered the issue of whether and under what

circumstances a civil sanction may be deemed to be a punishment for
the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 147

It said that "the

determination whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment
in the relevant sense requires a particularized assessment of the
penalty imposed and the purpose that the penalty may fairly be said
to serve. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes
punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves
the goal of punishment."'1
The Court noted the two most familiar
objectives of punishment: retribution and deterrence. 49 It further
stated that "[r]etribution and deterrence are not legitimate non-

The Court also said that in drafting the Double Jeopardy Clause, James Madison, focused
on the issue of multiple punishments. The Court cited the initial draft as saying: "No
person shall be subjected, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment
or one trial for the same offence." 1 Annals of Cong. 434 (1789-1791) (J. Gales ed. 1834)
cited in id. It also cited to its century-old precedent which held that: "If there is anything
settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be twice
lawfully punished for the same office." Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 168, 21 L.Ed. 872
(1874). See id.
139. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 287 cited in 490 U.S. at 437 (criminalizes "mak[ing] or
present[ing].... any claim upon or against the United States, or any department or agency
thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent.")
140. See 490 U.S. at 438.
141. Id.
142. 31 U.S.C. secs. 3729-3731. cited in id. at 438. (provides for civil penalty when "[a]
persons. .. (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to get false or fraudulent claim paid or approved.").
143.
144.
145.

See 490 U.S. at 438.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 438.

146. Id.
147. See id. at 446.
148. Id. at 448 (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 448 citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168, 83 S.Ct. 554,
567, 9 L.Ed. 644 (1963).

412
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punitive governmental objectives."' 150 Relying on Mendoza-Martinez,
the Court concluded that "[a] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained
as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment,
as we come to understand the term."15' The Court further concluded:
"[u]nder the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has
been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an
additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may
not fairly be 52characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or
retribution.'
According to Halper, therefore, the imposition of multiple
punishments is subject to the Double Jeopardy constraint.'53
Moreover, the nature of punishment is determined based primarily on
the purpose it purports to achieve, i.e., whether it is intended to
achieve the traditional purposes of punishment, i.e., retribution and
deterrence.14
The other important consideration is the
proportionality of the sanction to the damage caused. On this issue,

the Court said: "[t]he defendant is protected from a sanction so
disproportionate to the damage caused that it constitutes a second
punishment."'55
In Austin v. United States,'56 the Supreme Court considered

whether or not an in rem forfeiture was a purely civil sanction or
criminal punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment
excessive fines clause. 5 7 The Court said that the question that must
be asked is not whether forfeiture under the statute 5 s is civil or
150. Id. citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539, n. 20, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1874, n. 20 (1979).
151. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169, 83 S.Ct. at 568 cited in 490 U.S. at 448.
The court noted that the excessiveness of the civil sanction may be indicative of the civil or
criminal nature of the sanction. See id.
152. See 490 U.S. at 448-449.
153. See 490 U.S. at 448.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 450. The Court found that the governments costs to investigate a fraud in the
amount of $585 and the penalty of $130,000 sufficiently disproportionate to be considered a
second punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 452.
156. 509 U.S. 602,113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed. 488,61 USLW 4811 (1994).
157. See 509 U.S. at 604. The Eight Amendment provides that: "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
U.S. Const., Amend. VIII. Cited in it at n. 2.
158. See 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881(a)(4) and (a)(7). The statute provides for the forfeiture of,
among other things, "(7) All real property ....
intended to be used, in any manner or part,
to commit, or facilitate the commission of, a violation of... punishable by more that one
year's imprisonment." Cited in 509 U.S. at n.1.
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criminal but rather whether it is punishment or not.159 The Court
relied on Halper which held that: "a civil sanction that cannot fairly
be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be
explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is

punishment, as we come to understand the term."1" The Court then
asked the question whether at the time of the ratification of the Eight
Amendment, forfeiture was "understood at least in part as
punishment. '16 After a lengthy analysis of history

62

and precedent

63

the Court concluded that forfeiture has traditionally been considered,
at least in part as punishment) 6'
The Court then looked at congressional intent. It stated that by
linking the penalty with significant involvement in a criminal

enterprise and exemption of innocent owners, Congress clearly
intended to impose a penalty.165

It then concluded that forfeiture

under the provisions in question constituted punishment for the same
offense and as such subject to protections under the Eight
Amendment.' 66
The Court's analysis followed the Mendoza-Martinez although it
did not consider all the seven factors. As the above discussion

suggests, the most important factors for the Court's consideration of
the sanction as punishment were historical considerations, punitive
nature, the link with culpability, and finally congressional intent of
deterrence.

159. See 509 U.S. at 610.
160. See 490 U.S. at 448 cited in 509 U.S. at 610.
161. See 509 U.S. at 610-611.
162. Id. at 611-615.
163. Id. at 615-616. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974); J.W. Goldsmith,
Jr. Grant Co. v. United States 254 U.S. 505 (1921); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States,
96 U.S. 395 (1878); Harmony v. United States 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844); The Palmyra,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.), 6 L. Ed. 531 91827). All cited in 509 U.S. at 615. The Court said that
in all of these cases forfeiture was justified under two theories: (1) the legal fiction that the
property itself was "guilty," (2) the owner himself may be held accountable for allowing
others to use his property. Id. The Court then concludes that: "Both theories rest, on the
notion that the owner has been negligent in allowing his property to be misused and the he
is properly punished for the negligence." Id.
164. In so concluding, the Court stated that "forfeiture generally and statutory in rem
forfeiture in particular historically have been understood, at least in part, as punishment."
Id. at 618.
165. See 509 U.S. at 619. The Court said that in particular, Congress "chosen to tie
forfeiture directly to the commission of drug offences." It looked at the legislative history
and found that it was considered as a "powerful deterrent." S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 191
(1983) cited in id.
166. See 509 U.S. at 622.
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The same year, in Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
Ranch, 67 the Supreme Court again considered the meaning of
"punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause in light of
a state's tax assessment following criminal drug convictions for the
same conduct.' 6' Although the Supreme Court had on prior occasions
indicated that a tax might violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,'69 this
case was the first time ever that it held that a tax in fact violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause."
In this case, the Court considered the
issue of whether a state tax imposed on the possession of illegal drugs
assessed following the State's imposition of criminal penalty for the
same conduct violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. 7 '
The respondents in Kurth Ranch pleaded guilty to drug charges
and received various criminal penalties. 172 Citing to Halper,the Court
reaffirmed that labels do not control and concluded that a tax penalty
is not immune from double jeopardy inquiry simply because it is a
tax. 173 It further noted that a high rate of taxation or an obvious
deterrent purpose would not automatically make a tax a form of
174
punishment; however, it could be suggestive of a punitive character.
In this case, the tax was more than eight times the value of the
drugs.' 75 The Court concluded that the deterrent purpose of the drug
laws was beyond question because of the following statement
contained in the preamble of the statute: "[b]urdening" violators
instead of "law abiding taxpayers" and "that the use of dangerous
drugs is not acceptable; and that the Act is not intended to 'give
credence' to any17notion
that manufacturing, selling, or using drugs is
6
proper.,
or
legal

167. 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed. 2d 767, 62 USLW 4429, 73 A.F.T.R. 2d 942140 (1994).
168. See 114 S.Ct. at 1941.
169. See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L. Ed. 917 (1938).
170. See 511 U.S. at 799.
171. See 114 S.Ct. at 1941. The State statute at issue here imposed a tax on the
"possession and stage of dangerous drugs." See Mont. Code Ann Sec. 15-25-111 (1987)
cited in id. It imposes the tax after all state and federal fines and forfeitures have been
duly satisfied. See id. at Sec. 15-25-111(3) cited in id.
172. See 114 S.Ct. at 1942.
173. See 511 U.S. at 779, 114 S.Ct. at 1946.
174. See 114 S.Ct. at 1946.
175. Id.
176. Id. at n. 18 citing to 1987 Mont. Laws., ch. 563, p. 1416.
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The Kurth Ranch Court further noted that "the so-called tax"
was conditioned on the commission of a crime.177 That condition is

indicative of penal and prohibitory intent rather than the collection of
revenue because the tax assessment not only hinges on the
commission of a crime but also it is imposed only after the taxpayer
has been arrested for exactly the same reasons that would give rise to
the tax obligation.'78 The Court distinguished these taxes from taxes
with pure revenue-raising purposes that are imposed despite their
adverse effect on the taxed activity.179 It said the tax here is unique in

yet another way: it is imposed on criminals but no others-"it departs
so far from normal revenue laws as to become a form of

punishment."' 8
Relying on Halper,"' the Court concluded that because the tax
could fairly be characterized as punishment, the proceeding initiated
to collect taxes is the "functional equivalent of a successive criminal

prosecution.' " The

two most

important

considerations

are,

therefore, punitiveness and deterrence.

One of the two latest Supreme Court opinions relating to the
constitutional meaning of punishment is contained in Hudson v.
United States.' 83 In this case, the Court overruled Halper and
readopted its Ward-Kennedy approach. 8 It said that the proper

inquiry must be that: (1) whether, "in establishing the penalizing
mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for
one label or the other.' ' 85 (2) Even when such intent could be

discerned, an inquiry must be made whether the statutory scheme is
177. See 114 S.Ct. at 1947, 511 U.S. at 781.
178. Id.
179. The Court distinguished taxes imposed on activities that the government wants to
discourage but not ban. It said for example that although cigarette taxes are imposed to
discourage smoking, the product benefits of revenue, employment opportunities,
consumer satisfaction, etc., outweigh the banning of the product. These justifications do
not exist here because the substance is banned altogether. Id. at 114 S.Ct. at 1947.
180. See 114 S.Ct. at 1948.
181. That the constitutional protection against second punishment has "deep roots in
our history and jurisprudence." Halper, 490 U.S. at 440 cited in 114 S.Ct. at 1948.
182. See 114 S.Ct. at 1948-1949. The Court did not engage in Halper remedial purpose
analysis because it held that the state did not claim that the tax related to any cost of
investigation or actual damages to the state. Even if it did, there would be no
approximation since the tax applies regardless of whether the state suffered any damages
or not. See id.
183. 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
184. Id.
185. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 citing to Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-249.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 34.3

"so punitive either in purpose or effect ...as to transform what was
' 86
clearly intended as a civil remedy into criminal penalty.'
In determining whether the so-called civil sanction is so punitive
as to be considered a criminal penalty, the inquiry must follow the
seven Kennedy factors.' 87 It added that the factors must be applied "in
relation to the statute on its face,"' 88 and also that only "the 'clearest
proof' will suffice to override legislative intent and transform
what
89
has been denominated a civil remedy into criminal penalty."'

In overruling Halper, the court said that Halper "elevated a
single Kennedy factor-whether the sanction appeared excessive in
relation to its non-punitive purpose to dispositive status." '90 And
reemphasized that no one factor should be viewed as dispositive."'
The issue in this case was whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars a criminal prosecution based on a conduct that had already

resulted in an imposition of monetary penalty and occupational
debarment.'" In determining the issue, the Court engaged in the
Ward-Kennedy two-part test.' 93 It first considered whether Congress
intended a civil sanction rather than a criminal punishment. Then it
applied the Kennedy factors to determine whether there was "the
clearest of proofs" that the sanction is a criminal punishment despite
the label. 19'

The Court found that there was Congressional intent to keep the
sanction civil mainly because: (1) the monetary sanction has been
expressly designated as "civil,"' 95 (2) as to debarment, although there
is no express language, the fact that the authority to sanction was

186. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 citing Ward 448 U.S. at 248; Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956).
187. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 cited in Hudson, 522
U.S. at 99-100.
188. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169.
189. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
190. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101 citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169.
191. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101 citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169. The Court noted that
Halper's second departure was its assessment of the nature of the actual sanction rather than
evaluating the "statute on its face." 522 U.S. at 101 citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 447.
192. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 95. Petitioners were charged in the Western District of
Oklahoma with twenty-two counts of conspiracy, misapplication of bank funds, etc., under
18 U.S.C. Sec. 371, 656 and 2, and Sec. 1005. See id. at 97.
193. Id. at 103.
194. Id.
195. Id. The authority to administer the statute was granted to the "Appropriate
Banking Agenc[ies]" see 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1818(e)(1)-(3) cited in id.
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granted to an administrative agency is a prima facie evidence of
congressional intent to make a civil sanction. 9 6
Accordingly, the Court went on applying the Kennedy factors to
determine if despite the label, the sanction is so punitive as to be
considered a punishment. It held: (1) neither monetary penalties nor
debarment has historically been considered a criminal punishment;"
(2) the sanctions do not involve "affirmative disability or restraint"the prohibition from participating in banking activity does not
remotely resemble "the infamous punishment of imprisonment;"'98 (3)
because the penalty could theoretically be imposed even in the
absence of "bad faith" there is no intent requirement as such does not
depend on the finding of scienter; 99 (4) although the same conducts
could also be regarded as criminal conducts, that fact alone is not
sufficient to make the sanctions "criminally punitive; ' ' 20 and (5)

although the sanctions could deter future conducts thus serving the
traditional purpose of punishment, "the mere presence of this
purpose is insufficient to render a sanction criminal, as deterrence
"may serve civil as well as criminal goals., 20 ' It then concluded that
the application of the Kennedy factors did not show that there is the
"clearest proof" required under Ward. 202

The Court did not engage in the evaluation of two of the seven
Kennedy factors, i.e., (1) "whether an alternative purpose to which it
may be connected is assigned for it; ' 23 and (2) whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned., 02' These
factors, particularly, the proportionality inquiry, are precisely the
ones that Halper considered dispositive. 25 The Court in Hudson,
however, disregarded them completely. Their relevance in the
196. See id. citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402; United States v. Specter,
343 U.S. 169, 178 (1952) (Jackson J. Dissenting) (Administrative determinations of
liability to deportation have been sustained as constitutional only by considering them to
be exclusively civil in nature, with no criminal consequences or connotations."); Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (holding that quintessential criminal
punishments may be imposed only "by a judicial trial.")
197. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-169.
204. See id. See also Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99-100, 104-105.
205. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101.
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Court's analysis of the constitutional meaning of "punishment"
remains unclear in light of preexisting precedent.
The Supreme Court's second latest pronouncement relating to
the punitive nature of a nominal civil sanction is contained in Kansas
v. Hendricks' 6 Although this case mainly dealt with the nature of a
proceeding rather than the nature of the sanction, the Court's analysis
essentially followed the Kennedy factors to determine the criminal
character of a nominally civil proceeding.2 7
The petitioner in this case challenged the constitutionality of a
Kansas civil confinement statute on grounds of prohibitions against
Double Jeopardy and ex post facto law.'i The petitioner served
consecutive sentences for sexual violence.' 9 A second jury trial for
the determination of his mental condition adjudged him a "violent
predator."'2 1 The state then moved to confine him civilly according to
the civil confinement statute, which he challenged. 1
To determine the nature of the proceedings and the sanction, the
Court employed the Ward two-part test: (1) whether the legislator
intended a civil sanction; or (2) whether the nominally civil sanction is
so punitive as to be considered a punishment 2 The Court in this
case found a clear legislative intent to establish a civil confinement
213
process; however, it considered some of the Kennedy factors to
determine if it passes the second Ward test.214
The Court focused on four of the seven Kennedy factors: (1)
whether the sanction serves the traditional purposes of punishment; 25
(2) whether the conduct to which it is attached is already a crime; 16
(3) whether it is imposed on a finding of scienter; 27" and (4) whether it

206. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
207. See id.

208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 355.
Id.
Id. at 355-56.
Id. at 356.

212.

See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249 (1980) cited in id. at 361.

213.
214.
215.

See 521 U.S. at 361-62.
Id.
Id. at 362. It said that the Act's purpose is neither retributive nor deterrent.

216. Id. at 362. The Court said that "The Kansas Act does not make a criminal
conviction a prerequisite." While it certainly looks like it is the application of this
particular Kennedy factor, it is not entirely clear.
217. See id. at 362-63. The Court's analysis of scienter overlapped with its analysis of
retribution and deterrence and interestingly considered confinement conditions as
indicative of the absence of a finding of scienter. Id.
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involves a restraint.218 The Court answered the first two questions in
the negative but the third one in the affirmative. 219 However, it held
that the finding of restraint alone is not sufficient to make the
sanction a punishment because if detention alone is considered a
punishment then all involuntary civil confinements would be
impermissible punishments. 22' The Court's focus in this case was
essentially on the purpose of the sanction, particularly the existence
or non-existence of a retributive and deterrent purpose. It did not
find either.
Much like the cases discussed above, the Hendricks Court does
not answer the question relating to the weight that each one of the
Kennedy factors must carry. However, it reaffirms the continued
relevance and importance of these factors for the contemporary
jurisprudence of punishment. Although the weight question remains
unanswered, 22 a consistent theme could be identified: Ever since
Kennedy was decided in 1963, the seven Kennedy factors remained
relevant. The emphasis shifted from time to time; however, three
important considerations appear to have always figured prominent.
They could be stated in simple terms as: (1) the nature of the
sanction; (2) the actual severity of the sanction; and (3) the motive
behind the sanction. What could be concluded from the above rather
lengthy discussion of precedent is the following: a nominally civil
sanction that is sufficiently severe and motivated by the desire to
punish which clearly promotes the traditional purposes of
punishment, would likely be considered a punishment for purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, under current law, it appears
that each challenge needs to be evaluated in light of the seven
Kennedy factors, although a cumulative affirmance of all is not
required.
The Supreme Court has never considered the issue of
deportation in light of its contemporary punishment jurisprudence.
More than a century ago, in Fong Yue Ting v. United StateS,2" it held
that deportation proceedings are civil proceedings. 223 By 1924, it was
218. Id. at 363.
219. Id. at 361-63.
220. Id. at 363.
221. All the cases, discussed supra, that were decided after Kennedy focused on the
Kennedy factors although with different emphasis. The only guidance on this question is
that none of them are independently dispositive. For example, Halper was overruled
because of its exclusive reliance on the "excessiveness" factor alone.
222. 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
223. Id. at 728, 730.
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The decisions that followed

5

simply relied on such precedent. This precedent is not tenable for
three reasons: (1) it ignores recent developments in the jurisprudence
of individual liberties;226 (2) fails to consider the increasing
criminalization of the immigration law;227 and (3) it is exclusively
based on an assumption that all deportations occur as a result of
violations of the immigration laws of the nation.

The following part assesses the nature and consequences of the
deportation of refugee criminals in light of the jurisprudence
discussed in this section. It argues that deportation of refugees who
commit crimes occurs not to put an end to a continued violation of

224. See Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (holding that: "It is well settled that
deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, it is not punishment.").
225. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984 ("A deportation
proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to
punish.") In fact, in 1958 in Topp v. Dulles, the Court had said that the idea that
deportation is a civil sanction is fictional. See Topp v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 97 (1958).
226. See generally, Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, supra note
7 (arguing that the plenary power doctrine is a result of the Chinese Exclusion era and
must be revisited in light of modern developments relating to civil liberties and due
process.).
227. Traditionally deportation was reserved for very serious and violent crimes;
however, this trend has changed drastically over the last few decades. Compare the list of
crimes in the following enactments: Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
Sec. 7342, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.) (listing crimes
such as murder, trafficking in firearms and destructive devises); The Immigration Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 29
U.S.C.) (adding new offenses to the aggravated felony class including money laundering,
and crimes of violence); Violent Crimes Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (1994) (further
adding to the list); The Immigration and Technical Correction Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-416, 108 Stat. 4305 (1994) (adding to the list further); The Anti Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)
(expanding the list significantly to include crimes such as document fraud and perjury or
subornation of perjury, etc.) The Illegal Immigration and Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). (adding more
offenses to the list but most importantly lowering the term of imprisonment for some of
the offenses such as theft from five years to one year regardless of whether it is actually
imposed or suspended.) For commentary see, e.g., Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship &
Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611
(2003); Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in CongressionalFishnets-ImmigrationLaw's New
Aggravated Felons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 589 (1998).
228. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039. (holding that the purpose of deportation is
"to put an end to a continued violation of the immigration law.") This understanding of
the purpose of deportation prevailed for more than a century. See, e.g., Fong, 149 U.S.
689, 730 (1893).

Spring 2007]

COMMITING A CRIME WHILE A REFUGEE

421

immigration laws as it is said, 229 but to penalize the so-called aliens for

abusing their invitation.
IV. Is Deportation of a Refugee Who Commits a Crime a Civil
Sanction or Punishment?
A. Punishment in General
Punishment involves pain and deprivation, and as such requires
justification. 3 Utilitarianism and retributivisim have over the ages

been regarded as the dominant justifications."'

The essence of

3

utilitarianism is complex, and is outside the scope of this article. By
comparison, however, retribution appears to be increasingly the most

dominant justification of punishment.3

Retributivisim holds that

229. See Lopez, 468 U.S. at 1039.
230. Deportation of aliens for criminal conduct was for the first time introduced into
the laws of the United States in 1917. The legislative history of the Immigration Act of
1917 suggests that Congress considered the commission of a crime by an alien as "an abuse
of invitation" to the United States to reside in its territories. See Congressional Record,
53:5167-5172; see also Congressional Record, 53: 4768-816, 4841-85, 4932-62, 5023-52 &
5164-95 cited in Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment:A HistoricalAnalysis of the
British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L. J. 115, 149 (1999).
231. See, e.g., Kenet Greenawalt, Punishment, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 1336 (SANFORD H. KADISH, ED. 1983) 1336-1338 reprinted in JOSHUA
DRESSLER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 21(1994) ("Since punishment
involves pain or deprivation that people wish to avoid, its intentional imposition by the
state requires justification."); R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments 1 (1986) ("It is agreed
that a system of criminal punishment stands in need of some strenuous and persuasive
); Richard Wasserstrom, Why Punish the Guilty?, 20 PRINCETON U.
justification.
MAG. 14 (1964), reprintedin GERTRUDE EZORSKY (ED), PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON PUNISHMENT, 328, 337 (1972) ("Punishment is an evil, an unpleasantness; it requires
that someone suffer. Its infliction demands justification.")
232. See Kenet Greenwalt, Punishment,supra note 231 at 22.
233. For example, utilitarianism asks the question whether punishment "promotes
human happiness better than possible alternatives." Id. It has several components,
including deterrence, incapacitation, and reform. Id. at 25.
234. For example, James Stephen wrote in 1883 that the "[c]lose alliance between
criminal law and moral sentiment is in all ways healthy and advantageous to the
community. I think it highly desirable that criminals should be hated that the punishment
inflicted upon them should be so contrived as to give expression to that hatred, and to
justify it so far as the public provision of means for expressing and gratifying a healthy
natural sentiment can justify and encourage it ... Love and hate, gratitude for benefits,
and the desire of vengeance for injuries, imply each other as much as convex and
concave." James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of CriminalLaw of England, reproduced
in part in DRESSLER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 231 at 29. This theory is of course a
subject of great criticism, see, e.g., Joshua Dressier, Hating Criminals:How Can Something
That Feels So Good Be Wrong? 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1451 (1990).
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whoever committed a crime "deserves it."
Arguably rooted in
"vengeance, bloodlust, revenge, retaliation, and an eye for an eye, 236
237
outlook, this theory dominates today's criminal justice system,

notwithstanding society's claim of gradual civility.238 Evidently, when

immigrants commit crimes the retributive emotion acquires two
essential forms: the feeling of vengeance for the crimes they
committed which they share with the rest of the offending
community, and a feeling of vengeance because of their abuse of

invitation which they do not share with the rest of the offending
community. 239 State and federal criminal laws provide for the
punishment of all offenders but federal immigration law provides for

the deportation of immigrants including refugees after the penalty
prescribed under the applicable law has been served. The second
type of sanction, namely deportation, seems to serve the exact same
purpose as the first. In 1893, in his dissenting opinion in Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 240 Justice Field said:

235. See Kenet Greenwalat, Punishment, supra note 231 at 21. See also Immanuel
Kant, The Philosophy of Law, 194-198 reproduced in DRESSLER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra

note 231 at 27 ("Judicial punishment can never be administered merely as a means for
promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but
must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has
committed a crime.")
236. See Russell L Christopher, Deterring Retributivisim: The Injustice of "Just"
Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843, 845 (2002) citing Igor Primoratz, Justifying Legal
Punishment 13 (1989) ("The history of the retributive view of punishment begins with the
biblical and Talmudic ethical and legal ideas.")
237. As late as 1984, the Supreme Court held that retribution is the "primary
justification for the death penalty." Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461062 (1984). For a
similar proposition, see Mirko Bagoric & Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors of
Retributivisim, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 124, 126 (2000) ("Retributivism has been the
dominant theory of punishment in the Western world for the past few decades.") See also
David Dolinko, Retributivism, Consequentialism, and Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment,
16 LAW & PHIL. 507, 507 (1997) cited in Christopher, DeterringRetributivisim, supra note
236 at n.12 ("retributive theory is arguably the most influential philosophical justification
for the institution of criminal punishment in present-day America.").
238. Retribution relates to resentment and hatred. Professor Dressler says that
"retributive hatred" is "a morally suspect emotion" because its application is not limited
by personal morality. See Dressier, Hating Criminals,supra note 234 at 1462. There are,
of course, strong arguments in favor of the morally justifiableness of retributive justice.
See Dressler's commentary in Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy
(1988). See also Dressier, Hating Criminals,supra note 234. For example, Murphy argues
that hatred is an element of retributive emotion is rational and permissible. Id. at 1458.
239. See, e.g., Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms
and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003) (arguing that a culture of control
has dominated efforts in immigration reform.).
240. 149 U.S. 698, 13 S.Ct. 106 (1893).
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[b]ut it can never be admitted that the removal of aliens,
authorized by the act, is to be considered, not as a punishment
for an offense, but as a measure of precaution and prevention.
If the banishment of an alien from a country into which he has
been invited as the asylum most auspicious to his happiness-a
country where he may have formed the most tender
connections; where he may have invested his entire property,
and acquired property of the real and permanent as well as the
movable and temporary kind; where he enjoys, under the laws a
greater share of the blessings of personal security and personal
liberty than he can elsewhere hope for; if banishment of this
sort be not punishment, and among the severest of
punishments, it would be difficult to imagine a doom to which
the name can be applied. 24'
The following section demonstrates that deportation of refugees
who commit crimes is a second punishment which merely serves a
retributive purpose and as such a violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
B.

Punishment Jurisprudence - Kennedy Factors

As indicated above, the Supreme Court's current analysis of
whether a nominally civil sanction is punishment proceeds in two
distinct steps: (1) Whether Congress showed a preference for one or
the other label; (2) if the label is a civil sanction, whether the
application of the seven Kennedy factors negate that label. This
section addressed these issues.
i.

Legislative Labeling

The exclusion by law of refugees or any other immigrants from a
lawful status for commission of a certain class of crimes is not a new
phenomenon.242 What is new is the increasing criminalization of the
immigration law in recent decades. 243 As indicated above, even minor
offenses, such as shoplifting could now result in the deportation of
refugees and other categories of immigrants. The legislative labeling
and intent should thus be viewed in light of this changing landscape.
Because this article focuses on the deportation of refugees who have
committed crimes, the most relevant piece of legislation that this

241. See id. at 748-749 (Field J dissenting, quoting Madison, 4 Elliot, Deb).
242. It dates at least as far back as 1917. A congressional Act excluded certain
category of aliens. See note 230 supra.
243. See, e.g., Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 239. See generally Terry
Coonan, Dolphins Caught in Congressional Fishnets-ImmigrationLaw's New Aggravated
Felons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 589 (1998).
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inquiry focuses on is the 461980 Refugee Act 24 as amended in 1996 by
245

AEDPA

and IIRIRA.

No Court has ever analyzed legislative intent and labeling as it
pertains to the exclusion provisions of this Act or any other relevant
law for that matter. In fact, all prior inquiries involving deportation
of any category of immigrants focused not on the nature of the
deportation but on the nature of the proceedings. For example, in
INS

v.

Lopez-Mendoza

the

Supreme

Court

offered

a

comprehensive analysis of the civil nature of deportation proceedings.
However, its focus was on the procedural due process aspects of the

proceedings not on the substantive sanction that would ordinarily
result from the proceedings.

8

It held that "a deportation proceeding

is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this
country, not to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or
remaining unlawfully in this country is itself a crime.""2 9 It added that:

"Consistent with the civil nature of the proceeding, various
protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in
a deportation hearing."' 0 It then concluded: "The purpose of
deportation is not to punish past transgressions but rather to put an
end to a continuing violation of the immigration laws."'' Where such
violations do not exist because the alien has a lawful legal status, as in
the case of refugees, what then is the purpose?212 The answer to this
question seems to be "punishment." This issue will be discussed in

more detail in this and the following sections.

244. PL 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) Codified in 8 U.S.C.1158.
245. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
246. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
247. 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479 (1984).
248. See id.
249. See 468 U.S. at 1038.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1039 (emphasis added).
252. It might be argued that the commission of the crimes might make the lawful
resident to lose his status and become in technical violation of the immigration laws,
however, such general assumption cannot be valid for all types of lawful status. For
example, a refugee status may only be lost under conditions specified under INA 208(b)(c), which is essentially predicated on Art. 1 C of the Refugee Convention. (Although
stated in many different ways, these grounds essentially pertain to gaining full protection
from another country, and lack of continued eligibility because of a fundamental change of
circumstances in the home country.).
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Lopez-Mendoza relies on precedent and analyses statutes. The
precedents include the Chinese Exclusion era cases5' and all of the
statutes pertain to procedural due process matters.5 Hence, LopezMendoza does not hold or provide guidance regarding the legislative

labeling or legislative intent of any legislation as it pertains to the
nature of the order and execution of deportation but only the
proceeding. Certainly, it does not even consider any statutes that
have any bearing on refugee status.255
As indicated above, the 1980 Refugee Act has its origin in the
1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. 6 It
amended all existing laws having any bearing on refugee protection

and established "a more uniform basis for the provision of assistance
to refugees.257 Predicated on the Refugee Convention, 8 the Act
excluded from protection any alien who "having been convicted by a
final judgment of a particularly serious
crime constitutes a danger to
25 9
the community of the United States.,
The important question that needs to be asked under Kennedy is
whether in enacting this provision, Congress intended to penalize

253. The most important precedents that Lopez relies on are Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) and Bugajewitz v. Adam, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) cited in
468 U.S. at 1038. The holdings in these cases evidently fail to take recent jurisprudential
and constitutional developments into account.
254. The statutes include: 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1302, 1306, 1325 (criminalizing unlawful entry
and stay); 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1252(b) (providing for a hearing to continue in the absence of the
respondent if he fails to appear); 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1252(b) (Shifting the burden of proving
identity to the respondent); 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1252(b)(4) (providing that an order of
deportation need only be based on "reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence" not a
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.) All of these cited statues pertain to procedural due
process. The Court relied on them to support its conclusion that deportation proceedings
are civil rather than criminal.
255. As it is evident from the Double Jeopardy jurisprudence, proceedings and the
outcomes of the proceedings could be subjects of different inquiry which could produce
remarkably different results. For a different view, see Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as
Punishment,supra note 230 at 148 (suggesting that Lopez holds that Congress has labeled
deportation as a civil sanction)
256. See Part II, Section a (iii) supra.
257. See The Refugee Act of 1980, PL 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) Codified in 8 U.S.C.
1158 at Preamble.
258. See Refugee Convention, supra note 60 at art. 33.2. (The benefits of the present
provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds
for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the
community of the country.").
259. See Sec. 243(h)(B) of the Act; 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1253(h)(2)(B).
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criminal refugees or regulate immigration? In other words, was this
initially intended to be punitive or regulatory?
There are two competing interpretations of this provision
particularly as it relates to. the application of the factors of
excludability. The important factors are conviction of a crime and
danger to the community. The question is whether the two factors
need to be met cumulatively or alternatively.
The official interpretation of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) suggests that the two
requirements need to be met cumulatively:
A refugee committing a serious crime in the country of refuge is
subject to due process of the law in that country. In extreme
cases, Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the Convention permits a
refugee's expulsion or return to his former home country, if
having been convicted by a final judgment of a "particularly
serious crime, he constitutes a danger to the community of his
country of refugee." 2'6
This interpretation certainly suggests that it is a regulatory
endeavor to protect the community against dangerous criminals
rather than punishing the criminals themselves by subjecting them to
an additional punishment of returning them to a place where they
may face persecution, although that might be an unavoidable
consequence.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), however, offered an
entirely different interpretation of the application of the requirements
for exclusion. In the matter of Carballe,6' the BIA held that section
243(h)(2)(B) of the Act does not require two separate and distinct
factual findings to be made for an alien to become ineligible for
withholding of deportation.26 2 It stated that: "The focus here is on the
crime that was committed. If it is determined that the crime was a
'particularly serious' one, the question of whether the alien is a
danger to the community of the United States is answered in the
affirmative. We do not find that there is a statutory requirement for a
separate determination of dangerousness focusing on the likelihood
of future serious misconduct on the part of the alien., 26 3 The BIA

260. See UNHCR, Handbook on Procedure and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 Reedited January 1992. at 154.
261. 19 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA) 1986).
262. Id. at 360.
263. See id. citing Crespo-Gomez v. Richard, 780 F.2d 932 (11th Cir. 1986); ZarduiQuintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213 (11th Cir. 1985) (Vance, J., concurring).
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cited to the House Judiciary Committee's deliberation in support of
this interpretation."
Evidently, the BIA's interpretation of the exclusion provision is
at odds with the UNHCR's interpretation of the same provision
contained in the Refugee Convention.
While the Convention
interpretation focuses on the future danger to the community, the
BIA's interpretation focuses on the crime that had already been
committed. Although the distinction might appear artificial, their
application could indeed produce opposite results. While under the
UNHCR approach, a convicted felon who could prove that he has
been reformed and is not likely to pose any further danger to the
community might benefit from the withholding of deportation
provision, under the BIA's approach, this person would not be able to
claim the benefits regardless of any level of evidence of reform or
rehabilitation. It could be concluded, therefore, that the exclusion
provision under the Refugee Act is intended not only to exclude
dangerous individuals for the regulatory purpose of protecting the
host community but also for the purposes of penalizing the offender
for his crimes. Nonetheless, this may not be a clear indication of a
congressional preference of labeling the provision as punitive. Hence
the argument that Congress did not intend to make deportation a
result of ineligibility as it relates to this provision to be a punitive
sanction may have some validity. However, the amendments that
were made since the enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act, particularly
AEDPA and IIRIRA have put an end to any level of doubt regarding
the legislative preference of label.
To clarify the confusion relating to the exclusion provision of the
Refugee Act, Congress introduced a per se rule in 1990.265 In 1996,
Congress made its punitive intentions very clear when it enacted
AEDPA. As the name indicates, AEDPA is an act designed to fight
the crime of terrorism and provide for the effective death penalty.
Congress unequivocally stated the purpose of the Act to be: "An Act
to deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective
death penalty and for other purposes. ' , 266 Thus itis essentially a
criminal statute intended
to penalize wrongdoers.
A closer

264. See H.R. rep. No. 608, 9th Cong. 1st Sess. 17 (1979) cited in id. at 350-360.
265. See INA Sec. 101(a)(43), INA Sec. 243(h) (adding a new provision saying that
aggravated felonies are per se "particularly serious crimes" within the meaning of the
Refugee Act.).
266. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, heading, 110 Stat. 1214, heading (1996).
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examination of the statute and also its legislative history clearly

confirms this proposition.
Structurally AEDPA is mainly codified under Titles 18, and 8 of

the United States Code which deal with crimes and criminal
procedure, and aliens and nationality respectively.267 Content wise,

among other things, it defines crimes, 26" prescribes penalties for
26'

27

crimes,
enhances law enforcement,
establishes criminal alien
identification system,"' provides for criminal alien removal

procedures, 272and eliminates judicial review of final deportation
orders resulting from criminal convictions. 273 And it clearly states
that: "An alien convicted of an aggravated felony shall 2be74
conclusively presumed to be deportable from the United States.

Such presumption works regardless of the type of immigration status
that the alien may have. This statute's crime control and punitive
purpose is thus very clear from its face, and of course, the label is not
hidden.

267. Id. at table of contents. A statutes' structural placement is indicative of its nature.
For example, in Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme Court said that the placement of a
statute under a civil heading is indicative of legislative intent to provide for a civil remedy.
See 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997). In this case the in question was codified under "Care and
Treatment of Mentally Ill Persons" instead of the State's criminal code. Id. The Court
said that that is indicative of legislative intent to provide for a civil proceeding rather than
a criminal one. Id.
268. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 104-132, heading, 110 Stat. 1214, heading (1996) at title
IV(D(440) (expanding the criminal conducts considered aggravated felonies. Additions
include perjury or subornation of perjury. See id. at (e)(S) amending 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43).
See also title III, Sec. 323 (modifying the definition of providing material support for
terrorism.) and see also title IV. Sec. 435. This provision expands the criteria of
deportation for crimes of moral turpitude. Courts have interpreted crimes of moral
turpitude liberally to include conducts such as providing false information on a student
loan application see Kabongo v. INS, 837 F. 2d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 1988), or heterosexual
sodomy, see Velez-Lonzano v. INS 463 F. 2d 1305, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For a list of
crimes that are and are not considered crimes of moral turpitude, see STEPHEN
LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, 442 (1997).
269. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 104-132, heading, 110 Stat. 1214, heading (1996) at title VII.
Sec. 705 (Increased penalties for certain terrorism crimes.).
270. See, e.g., id. at title VIII.
271. See, id. at title IV(D)(432).
272. See generally id. at title IV(D).
273. See id. at Sec. 440 ("Any final order of deportation against an alien who is
deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 241(a)(2)
(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which
both predicate offenses are covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i), shall not be subject to
review by any court.").
274. See id. at Sec. 442(c) amending INA Sec. 242(a); and 8 U.S.C. 1252(a).
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Perhaps the most telling source of evidence relating to the
punitive purpose of the statute, particularly as it relates to refugees
who commit crimes, comes from AEDP's legislative history. The
following passage from the House Judiciary Committee Report on
the purpose of the passage of the bill then called H.R. 668 is
instructive. It reads in pertinent part:
In considering which crimes should be designated as
aggravated felonies, the Committee has also been mindful of
the provisions of section 243(h) of the INA. Under that
section, a person who is deportable may prevent their
deportation if they can demonstrate that their life or freedom
would be threatened in the country to which they would be
deported. However, this defense is not available to persons
who commit aggravated felonies. In proposing the
amendments to the definition of aggravated felony, the
Committee continues to be concerned with the fact that
deportation may result in a threat to the life or freedom of
some aliens. The Committee believes, however, that the crimes
defined as aggravated felonies are those that clearly
demonstrate a disregardfor this nation's laws. In the view of
the Committee, those who choose not to abide by this
nation's laws, and particularly those whose criminal activity
physically harms others,
have no legitimate claim to remain
1
in the United States.7
The House Judiciary Committee made its views clear that those
who choose not to abide by the "nation's laws" have no legitimate
claims. 76 The use of the terms "disregard for this nation's laws" and
also "who choose not to abide by this nation's laws" are all the more
familiar terms associated with the desire to punish not because they
committed specific acts in violation of specific criminal laws but
because they chose to disregard the "nation's laws."
While a
particular immigrant committing an aggravated felony is guilty of one
actus reus, relating to that felony, he is, however, guilty of two distinct
mens rea for the same actus reus: The first is the mens rea associated
with the violation of the specific criminal statute that he violated,
which would be punishable according to that law, and the second is

275. See H.R. REP. 104-22, H.R. Rep. No. 22, 104TH Cong., 1st Sess. 1995, 1995 WL
56411 (Leg.Hist.) background and need for legislation, at 6 (emphasis added.).
276. It could not candidly be suggested that the usage of the term "legitimate" in this
context refers to the grounds of exclusion in the Refugee Convention or INA discussed in
some detail supra.
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associated with the misfortune of violating the "nation's laws," which
would be punished by deportation according to the immigration law.
In fact, some members did not hide the fact that they wanted to
punish immigrants who violate the "nation's laws" and punish them
with deportation. Senator Toby Roth's statement relating to the
AEDPA is exemplary:
In response to these problems, I introduced legislation last
Congress and again during this one that would simplify the task
of sending criminal aliens home. I am gratified that through the
work of Senator ABRAHAM and the Judiciary Committee, S.
1664 contains some of the provisions in my legislation, as well as
some additional improvements. Among them are the following:
First, the bill broadens the definition of aggravated felon to
include more crimes punishable by deportation. Second, it
prohibits the Attorney General from releasing criminal aliens
from custody. Third, it requires the Attorney General to deport
criminal aliens-with certain exceptions-within 30 days of the end
of the aliens' prison sentence, and mandates that such criminal
aliens ordered deported by taken into custody pending
deportation. Finally, it gives Federal judges the ability
to
S•
277 order
deportation of a criminal alien at the time of sentencing.

277. See 142 Cong. Rec. S4592-01, S4600 (May 2, 1996). Opinions delivered by other
members of Congress also suggest that deportation in the sense of the Act was generally
viewed as a punishment. The following two opinions are instructive:
Representative Seastrand's statement in support of amendment to INA 212(a)(6)
relating to grounds of inadmissibility and illegal entry and immigration violations
reads as follows: This amendment is going to bring honesty and integrity back to
the U.S. immigration laws. Simply put, "If you don't play by the rules, then you
don't get to play at all. No more warnings, no more slaps on the wrist. When we
catch you, you're gone." Never again will those who break the law be rewarded
with a temporary or immigrant visa. No longer will they be able to enjoy the
benefits of our hardworking citizens and the ones they are entitled to. Not 1 year
later, not 10 years later. "One strike andyou're out." (emphasis added)
See 142 Cong. Rec. H2378-05, H2458 Another member of Congress, Representative
Becerra commenting on the harshness of deportation as punishment said:
Here again we seem to see an amendment that attacks the issue with a very small
perspective, with blinders, and says only to those who have crossed a border, and
certainly the focus is on the southern border, and certainly it is in regard to
people who look like they come from across the southern border, and its says to
those individuals, "Forever more you will be denied access to this country."
Admittedly, you committed a wrong, and everyone should admit that, and that
person should be punished, not only with deportation but with punishment that
would require that person not be able to come into this country for a time. But
this amendment goes well beyond and says never again will you set foot in this
country regardless of how compelling your case is to perhaps at some point come
back. At the same time while it is doing this as dramatically to this one
individual, this immigrant, in denying him or her access, it says to fully 50 percent
or more of those who are undocumented into this country, that they do not have
to worry about this amendment because it will not apply. I think that is not only
unfair treatment but unwise policy.
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Senator Abraham's statement regarding the effects of IIRIRA
was to the same effect: He said: "You do not shut down the borders.
What you
do is you say we're going to apply the criminal laws more
2 78
harshly.
On the occasion of the signing of the bill, President Bill Clinton,
made the following statement:
This bill also makes a number of major, ill-advised changes in our
immigration laws having nothing to do with fighting terrorism.
These provisions eliminate most remedial relief for long-term
legal residents and restrict a key protection for battered spouses
and children. The provisions will produce extraordinary
administrative burdens on the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. The Administration will urge the Congress to correct
them in the pending immigration reform legislation.27"
The immigration reform legislation that the President referred to
in his remarks was IIRIRA. It did not, however, correct the "illadvised" provisions of the AEDPA but rather expanded them.
IIRIRA's crime control and punitive nature is undisputable. Not
only did it add to the list of crimes previously considered to be
aggravated felonies,' but it also lowered the threshold penalty that
may be attached
for the commission of the designated class of
offenses." 1
The IIRIRA maintains the per se rule, which holds that
"aggravated felonies" are considered "particularly serious crimes"
within the meaning of the Refugee Act&m Under IIRIRA, which
represents the current state of the law, a refugee who commits a
shoplifting offense and receives a suspended sentence of one year
would be deportable.'3 Evidently, this is a significant departure from
See 142 Cong. Rec. H2378-05, H2458-59.
278. See Lisa Zagaroli, Senators Use Rank to Set Pet Priorities,DET. NEWS, Mar. 23,

1997, at B5 cited in Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportationas Punishment: Why At
Least Some of the Constitutional CriminalProcedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN.
L. REV. 305, 334 (2000).

279. See Presidential Statement on Anti-terrorism Bill, The White House, April 24,
1996, WL 203049.
280. See IIRIRA, supra note 4 at Sec. 321(a)(a), INA Sec. 101(a)(43)(A).
281. See id. at 321(a)(3); INA Sec. 101(a)(43)(F) &(G) (lowering the penalty from five
years to one year for crimes such as theft.) See also id. at Sec. 440(e)(4) &(6), INA Sec.
101(a)(43)(o) & (P) (lowering the prison sentence requirement of 18 months for document
fraud to 12 months.).
282. See IIRIRA, supra note 4 at Sec. 305, INA 241(b)(3(B)(ii)) (stating that all
aggravated felonies as defined in 101(a) 43are particularly serious crimes.).
283. See IIRIRA, supra note 4 at 321(a)(3), INA, Sec. 101(a)(43)(G). See also INA
Sec. 241(b)(3)(B(ii); 101(a)(43).
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the requirements of the Refugee Convention, which is limited to
exclusion of the most dangerous of criminals from the benefits of
refugee protection.2" By steadily increasing the number of crimes to
be regarded as felonies and prescribing deportation as an additional
predicament for aliens who violate the "nation's laws," Congress has
made its punitive intent very clear. IIRIRA's and its predecessors'
crime control and punitive objectives are thus unmistakable.285
Under Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the punishment inquiry
would ordinarily end there because Congress's punitive intent has
been established.
However, despite this clear punitive intent, the
immigration system currently operates under the presumption that
these legislations prescribe deportation as a civil sanction not as a
punishment merely because of existing precedent and tradition. The
application of the seven Kennedy factors is thus necessary not only to
further demonstrate Congress's punitive intent but also to show that
deportation of refugees who commit crimes is indeed a second
punishment by all relevant standards of measurement.
ii. How Do the Kennedy FactorsWeigh?
As indicated above, the seven Kennedy factors remained at all
times relevant for the assessment of the punitive character of a
nominally civil sanction.
Although the Supreme Court never
considered all of the factors relevant for all inquiries, presumably, the
satisfaction of the majority of the factors would mean that a
nominally civil sanction is in fact a punishment. The satisfaction of all
of the seven factors would certainly mean that it is indeed
punishment. This section demonstrates that the deportation of

284. The general understanding among international law scholars is that the exclusion
from refugee status of those who otherwise qualify should be reserved for dangerous
criminals who pose serious treat to the host country. See, e.g., GUNNEL STENBERG, NONEXPULSION AND NON-REFOULMENT, 221 (1989) (arguing that the exclusion clause of the
Refugee Convention, must only apply to those "refugees who seriously threaten the
foundation of the state or even its existence.").
285. President Bill Clinton's remarks at the signing of the bill support this conclusion.
He said: "This bill also includes landmark immigration reform legislation that reinforces
the efforts we have made over the last three years to combat illegal immigration. It
strengthens the rule of law by cracking down on illegal immigration at the border, in the
workplace, and in the criminal justice system-without punishing those living in the
United States legally, or allowing children to be kept out of schools and sent into the
streets." See Presidential statement on the occasion of he signing of budget and
immigration bill 9/30/1996, available at 1996 WL 555150.
286. See 372 U.S. 144 (1963)
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refugees who committed deportable crimes satisfies all the seven

factors and is thus unmistakably a second punishment.
1. Does Deportation Involve Affirmative Disability or Restraint?

The most obvious sanction involving affirmative disability or
restraint is imprisonment;' however, the Supreme Court has over the
ages considered less severe forms of sanctions as sufficiently
restraining as to be considered punishments. These sanctions include
prohibition to practice one's chosen vocation," and deprivation of

citizenship. 9
Deportation, as it involves refugees who commit felonies, is
certainly analogous to imprisonment because of several reasons: (1) It
involves the physical custody of the deportee before deportation and
the forced physical removal of the individual often in handcuffs or

other forms of body chains;2' (2) it involves the physical delivery of
them to the custody of authorities who had persecuted them in the
past and are likely to persecute them in the future;29 (3) it would take
them away from "all that makes life worth living;"292 and (4) it would

287. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960).
288. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1964) ("legislative decree of
perpetual exclusion from a chosen vocation ... is punishment, and of a most sever type.")
but see Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997) (holding that prohibition from
participating in banking industry is not sufficiently severe to be considered anything
"approaching the infamous punishment of imprisonment.").
289. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963). See also Tropp v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 97-98 (1958) ("Plainly legislation prescribing imprisonment for the
crime of desertion is penal in nature. If loss of citizenship is substituted for imprisonment,
it cannot fairly be said that the use of this particular sanction transforms the fundamental
nature of the statute. In fact, a dishonorable discharge with consequent loss of citizenship
might be the only punishment meted out by a court-martial.").
290. For example, in July of 2002, reports indicated that sixty-three citizens of the
Philippines deported from the United States arrived at the Manila airport in shackles-the
body chains were kept on them for the entire sixteen-hour flight. See Blanche Rivera, U.S.
Action Triggers Chain Reaction in Rp, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, July 22, 2002, at 1
cited in Michelle Roe Pinzon, Was the Supreme Court Right? A Closer Look at the True
Nature of Removal Proceedingsin the 21st Century, 16 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 29, N.20 (2003).
See also Elliot Blair Smith, Missteps Result in Deportations,USA TODAY, July 11, 2002, at
9A (reporting the deportation of 131 individuals to Pakistan in shackles.) cited in id.
291. The consequence of deportation, i.e., the possibility of persecution upon arrival is
an important consideration. For example, in Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme Court
suggested that the conditions surrounding confinement for mental disorder were not so
bad as to be considered punitive. 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997). That means, the possibility of
the opposite conditions would suggest a punitive character.
292. This last phrase is borrowed from Justice Brandeis's statement in Ng Fung Ho v.
White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
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invariably impose permanent restrictions on reentry; 293 and (5) in
ordinary terms, it would likely lead to actual imprisonment, torture,
disappearance and other types of measures that the refugee had fled

in the first place. Therefore, deportation of refugees does indeed
involve many affirmative disabilities and restraints and as such clearly
meets this first requirement.
2. Has Deportation Historically Been Regarded as Punishment?
Throughout history, banishment and exile have been used as

punishment for different offenses.'

Historical evidence suggests that

banishment was prescribed as punishment as far back as the twelfth

century in England.29 ' As it had increasingly been viewed as an
alternative to the death penalty, a transportation system was designed
to banish offenders.2 It was not, however, until the seventeenth
century that it became a judicially sanctioned penalty. 297 Scholars
suggest that banishment was so attractive as a form of law
enforcement because it essentially achieved what the death penalty is
designed to achieve albeit somewhat mercifully.2

One scholar

commented that "[e]xecution is a simple punishment, quick, effective,

293. For example, under the IIRIRA, a person who has been removed for a conviction
of a felony is permanently barred from reentering the United States for twenty years. See
IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Sec. 301(b), INA Sec. 212(a)(9)(A)(i). ("Any alien who has
been ordered removed ... and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of
such removal (or within twenty years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at
any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.")
(emphasis added).
294. See Salmond, Citizenship and Allegiance, 17 L. Q. REV. 270, 276 (1901) cited in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) at n. 23.
295. See William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 569 (1938) cited in Javier
Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment,supra note 230 at 120.
296. Other factors might have also contributed for the origination of the transportation
system. See J.M BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660-1800, at 496
(1986) cited in Bleichmar, Deportationas Punishment,supra note 230 at n. 33.
297. See, e.g., SHAW, CONVICrS AND THE COLONIES: A STUDY OF PENAL
TRANSPORTATION FROM GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND TO AUSTRALIA AND OTHER
PARTS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 24-25 (1966) cited in Bleichmar, Deportation as

Punishment,supra note 230 at 121.
298. See Beattie cited in Bleichmar, Deportationas Punishment, supra note 230 at 123.
See also Wm.Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of Its Use and a Proposalfor Its
Abolition Under the FirstAmendment, 24 N.E. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CON. 455, 462 (1998)
cited in Michelle Roe Pinzon, Was the Supreme Court Right? A Closer Look at the True
Nature of Removal Proceedings in the 21st Century, 16 Y.Y.U INT'L L. REV. 29 at n. 214
(suggesting that the act was designed to remove criminals from the English society.).
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to what
economical, but not merciful. Hence perhaps the resort
' 299
seemed to many to be the next best thing-banishment. ,
The enactment in 1718 of a uniform Transportation Act marked
the formalization of banishment as the normal punishment for some
types of felonies.' According to estimates, in the eighteenth century,
about 50,000 convicted felons had arrived in the American colonies,
which constituted about a quarter of British immigrants to colonial

America. 31 Hence, at the time of the drafting and ratification of the
constitution, this practice of banishment as punishment was well
recognized.'

Striking similarities could be noted between banishment of felons
in the eighteenth century and deportation of aggravated felons today.

As prescriptions for criminal conducts, they both accomplish exactly
the same objectives, punishing the offenders by sending them to
locations away from all they have and ridding the society of
undesirables. In fact, in 1947, the Supreme Court in Degladillo v.
3 noted that "Deportation can be the equivalent of
Carmichaelm
banishment or exile." ' The similarity of the two measures is indeed

299. See

SHAW,

cited in Bleichmar, Deportationas Punishment,supra note 230 at 123.

300. See WILFORD OLDHAM, BRITAIN'S CONVICTS TO THE COLONIES 11 (1990) cited

in Bleichmar, Deportationas Punishment, supra note 230 at 125.
301. See A. ROGER EKIRCH, BOUND FOR AMERICA: A

PROFILE OF BRITISH
CONVICTS TRANSPORTED TO THE COLONIES 1718-1775, in ERIC H. MONKKONEN (ED),
CRIME & JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: THE COLONIES AND EARLY REPUBLIC, 88,

92 (1991)
suggested
offenders.
Hundred

cited in Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment, supra note 230 at 127. It is
that, in fact, forty-three percent of those ordered transported were capital
See EKIRCH, cited in Bleichmar at 128. See also William P. Quigly, Five
Years of English Poor Laws, 1349-1834: Regulating the Working and

Nonworking Poor,30 AKRON L. REV. 73, n. 210 (1996) See also Christopher T. Wonnell,

Market Causes of Constitutional Values, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 399, n. 133 (1995) both
cited in Michelle Roe Pinzon, Was the Supreme Court Right? supra note 298 at n. 212
(suggesting that the felon transportation system aided indentured servitude in America.).
302. It was of course a subject of great criticism. For example, Benjamin Franklin is
reported to have condemned this practice as a member of the Constitutional Convention.
See Petition of Benjamin Franklin to House of Commons (Apr. 1766), in THE PAPERS OF
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, VOL XIII, at 12-15 (LEONARD W. LABAREE & WILLIAM B.

WILCOX EDS., 1959) cited in Bleichmar at 129. The system of transportation as
punishment was eventually suspended when America declared its independence. See
OLDHAM, cited in id. at 128.

303. 332 U.S. 388 (1947).
304. Id. at 391 citing to Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945). In Bridges, the
Court emphasized the harshness of deportation by quoting Justice Brandeis's now-famous
statement that deportation takes away a person from "all that makes life worth living." See
326 U.S. at 147 citing to Ng Fung, Ho. v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). In his dissenting
opinion in Boutilier v. INS reiterated the Court's statement in Bridges saying:
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Therefore, it is fair to conclude that deportation,

meaning the removal by force of a person from a place where he
wants to be to a place where he does not want to be, has historically
been used as a form of punishment for wrong doing.
3. Does Deportation Only Come into Play on a Finding of Scienter?
Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "scienter" as: "A degree

of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the
consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act's having
been done knowingly., 305 Deportable offenses are generally classified
under two broad categories: crimes of moral turpitude,"

and

aggravated felonies.07 The term "moral turpitude" is not a defined
term; however, courts commonly employ the following definition:
"An act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty

between man and man." 38 An act of "baseness or vileness or
depravity" certainly requires scienter. In fact, scienter seems to be a
central element of the so-called acts of moral turpitude according to
this definition. Perhaps the most notable seeming exception is the
crime of statutory rape, which courts have classified as a crime of
moral turpitude.'
Courts are, however, split on the question of
whether mens rea, at least as it relates to the knowledge of the
offender of the age of victim is concerned. For example, in People v.
Hernandez,31 ° the California Supreme Court recognized that statutory

rape requires criminal intent."' It said: "it is not conduct alone but
"[d]eportation is the equivalent of banishment or exile. Though technically not criminal, it
practically may be." 387 U.S. 118, 131 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
305. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
306. See INA 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4); 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(a)(9).
307. See INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(43). Although drug crimes
constitute another broad category, most of the trafficking offenses also qualify as
aggravated felonies.
308. See, e.g., Tillinghast v. Edmead (1929, CA1 Mass) 31 F2d 81; United States ex rel.
Ciarello v. Reimer (1940, DC NY) 32 F Supp 797; United States ex rel. Manzella v.
Zimmerman (1947, CA3) 71 F Supp 534; Coykendall v. Skrmetta (1927, CA5 Ga) 22 F2d
120; Ng Sui Wing v. United States (1931, CA7 I11)46 F2d 755; United States v. Carrollo
(1939, CA 8 DC Mo) 30 F Supp 3; Vidal y Planas v. Landon (1952, CA9, Cal) 104 F Supp
384. cited in 23 A.L.R. Fed. 480.
309. See, e.g., Pino v. London, 349 U.S. 901 (1955); Franklin v. INS, 72 F. 3d 571, 588
(8th Cir.); Ng Sui Wing v. United States, 46 F. 2d 755, 756 (7th Cir.)
310. 393 P. 2d 673 (1964).
311. Id. at 675.
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conduct accompanied by certain specific mental states which
concerns, or should concern the law. ' ' 31 2 Three more jurisdictions
have thus far followed the trend that the California Supreme Court
has set
with respect to the requirement of men rea in statutory rape
313
cases.

As a matter of principle of criminal law, the Supreme Court in
Staples v. United States3"4 has said that, mens rea, as a requirement of
criminal guilty is so firmly embodied in the common law that it is "the
rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of AngloAmerican criminal jurisprudence."" 5 In fact, the BIA's own precedent
suggests that the intent requirement is indeed central to the concept
of crimes of moral turpitude. For example, in Matter of B, the BIA
held that a foreign conviction for passing a bad check is not a crime of
moral turpitude because the statute did not require intent to
defraud.3 6 Similarly, in the Matter of Khalik, the BIA held that
passing a bad check may constitute a crime of moral turpitude where
the statute requires intent to defraud."7 Categorically speaking, in the
Matter of Awaijane, 8 the BIA said: "Malicious intention or what is
between crimes
equivalent to such intention is the broad boundary
'3 9
involving moral turpitude and those which do not. , 1
Regardless of whether the potential deportee is in a jurisdiction
where scienter is required or not, this is indeed an incidental
exception very unlikely to negate the argument that ordinarily crimes
of moral turpitude are crimes requiring scienter. At least that is what
the definition noted above clearly suggests.

312. Id.
313. See Michelle R. Vanyo, A Dereliction of Duty by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in Failing to Recognize the Mistake of Fact Defense as a Necessary Component to
Guaranteeinga Defendant's ConstitutionalDue Process Rights, 59 MD. L. REV. 860, 866
(2000).
314. 511 U.S. 600, (1994).
315. Id. at 605 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436
(1978).
316. See Matter of B, 3 1 & N. Dec. 278 (1948).
317.

See Matter of Khalik, 17 1 & N. Dec. 518 (1980).

318. 14 1& N. Dec. 117 (1972).
319. See id. at 118. For a discussion of crimes of moral turpitude in the immigration
context, see C. GORDON, IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW, 4.14 (1985) (major crimes
against person involve moral turpitude if "evil or predatory intent") cited in Maryellen
Fullerton & Noah Kingstein, Strategiesfor Ameliorating the Immigration Consequences of
CriminalConvictions:A Guide for CriminalDefense Attorneys, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 425,
235 (1986).
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Aggravated felony, on the other hand, is a defined term
comprising twenty-one categories of offenses. ° It is difficult to find
any crime that is categorized as an aggravated felony under INA Sec.
101(a)(43) that does not require scienter. Although rape is listed
under (43)(A), it is disputable whether statutory rape, which is a
different category of crime, is included in that category. To the extent
it might be argued that it is included, the argument made under
crimes of moral turpitude above are equally applicable.
Except in some negligible instances, the category of crimes that
would result in the deportation of a refugee require scienter. In fact,
admittedly, it is their gravity or perceived depravity that made them
deportable offenses in the first place. Hence it could fairly be
concluded that deportation of refugees occurs upon a finding of
3211
scienter.
4.

Does Deportation Promote the Traditional Aims of Punishment:
Deterrence and Retribution?

Immigration control in general has increasingly become crime
control sharing the same characteristics with the criminal justice
system to the point where the two are sometimes indistinguishable. 2
For example, the term "aggravated felony" appears to be a criminal
law concept but it is an immigration law creation which has now
become an integral part of the criminal justice system.313 Similarly,
320. Examples include: theft, document fraud, money laundering, etc. See 8 U.S.C.
Sec. 1101(a)(43).
321. For a different view on this issue see Bleichmar, Deportationas Punishment,supra
note 230 at 154-154. The Supreme Court's analysis of this factor in each one of the several
cases, discussed in Part III supra, dealt with single statutes prescribing a particular conduct
or omission. The question of whether the penalty comes into play only on a finding of
scienter could easily be answered when the proscribed conduct is one or just a few. But
here multiple proscriptions are involved. The existence of one possible exception should
not in any way undermine the argument that sceinter is indeed required in almost all of
the included offenses.
322. For a thorough discussion of this proposition, see generally, Miller, Citizenship &
Severity supra note 23. See also Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalizationof Immigration
Law: Employer Sanctions and MarriageFraud,5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669 (1997); Daniel
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Hard
Laws Making Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889 (2000); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation
and Justice: A Constitutional Dialogue, 41 B.C. L. REV. 771 (2000); Helen Morris, Zero
Tolerance: The Increasing Criminalization of the Immigration Law, 74 INTERPRETER
RELEASES, 1317, NO. 33 (1997).

323. Congress introduced the concept of "aggravated felony" for the first time in 1988
through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The concept was limited to serious crimes such
as murder, drug, firearm, and explosives trafficking. See Coonan, Dolphins Caught, supra
note 243 at 592-593. See also Miller, Citizenshipand Severity: supra note 239 at 633-634.
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crimes of moral turpitude perhaps have more immigration
consequences than any criminal consequences. 324 Undoubtedly,
deportation, as a prescription for commissions of designated class of
crimes by aliens, serves the two most important purposes of criminal
punishment, i.e., deterrence and retribution.
Deportation of criminal aliens serves two primary deterrent
purposes: The deterrence of the commission of certain types of crimes
by immigrants already in the United States, and the deterrence of the

commission of certain other types of crimes by potential immigrants
or those who aid them.325

Deportation as a consequence of an immigrant's commission of
designated class of crimes certainly sends a clear message to the
immigrant next door: That engaging in such conduct would have

more sever consequences than just receiving a suspended sentence,
paying some money or serving some time. Undisputedly, the addition
of deportation to some other penalty for the commission of an
offense makes the cumulative effect of the penalty much more severe.
To the extent the degree of severity of a punishment is said to have a
direct correlation with its deterrent effect, deportation as an added
penalty, serves the same deterrent purpose as prescribing more term

of imprisonment or more pecuniary determent, etc.
Congress increasingly looked to criminal law to address the
problem of illegal immigration in recent decades prompting some
scholars to suggest that Congress choose a method of "governing
through crime. 3 26 An important consideration for this choice is the
incapacitation aspect of the measure of deportation.327
Once

324. The term "crimes of moral turpitude" was introduced for the first in the
immigration law context in 1891 See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229 (1951) citing
Act of March 3, 1891, Stat. 1084. It continued to be an important part of the immigration
law. Id. at n. 14. The concept is also used in many different areas such as disbarment of
attorneys, revocation of medical licenses, impeachment of witnesses, etc. Id. at 227.
325. The third category of persons that the immigration law aims to deter is citizens
who hire unauthorized aliens. Deportation is not prescribed for these offenses as they
invariably involve U.S. citizens, as such the deterrent effect of the immigration law as it
relates to citizens is not discussed here.
326. See Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crimes, in THE CRIME CONUNDRUM
ESSAYS IN JUSTICE (L. FRIEDMAN & FISCHER EDS., 1997) cited in Miller, Citizenship &
Severity, supra note 239 at 618.
327. For a brief discussion of this consideration, see Robert A Mikos, Enforcing State
Law in Congress's Shadow, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1411, 1448 (2005). See also STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND

AMERICA, 208-209 (1987) (suggesting deportation serves a classic purpose of punishment

by incapacitating the offender.).
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deported, no state has to deal with the criminality of the same alien. 28
If he ever attempts to reenter, he will serve more severe penalties and
will be deported again and barred from coming back forever.3 9 That

sends a clear message.
Deportation of aliens also deters potential immigrants from
breaking the law to enter the country or commit crimes after they
entered. Any immigration laws that Congress enacts and any
immigration reforms that it adopts are increasingly aimed at sending a
message to those who might attempt to break the law to immigrate or
do so thereafter.33 °
For example, Julie Myers, Assistant Secretary of the ICE,

commenting on the establishment of a new detention facility in Texas
said: "This new facility enables us to have deterrence with dignity by
allowing families to remain together, while sending the clear message

that families entering the United States illegally will be returned
home. ,

33

1

Deportation also aims to deter aliens who assist others to break
the law from doing so. For example, the INA provides that "any
alien who knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or

aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in
violation of law is deportable. ''33 1 Under this provision, the prescribed

penalty is deportation. One of the purposes is obviously deterrence.
In fact, citizens are also penalized for doing the same acts but the
penalty does not include deportation for obvious reasons.333 As

328. A number of social benefits are attributable to this measure such as lifting some
burden from the criminal justice system by removing potential recidivists. See Mikos,
Enforcing State Law supra note 327 at 1448-1449. For example, in the year 2003 alone, the
Office of Detention and Removal (ODR) under the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) removed 78,000
criminal aliens from the United States.
See http//www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/
dro050404.htm (last visited on June 14, 2006). The ICE is the largest investigative agency
within the DHS. It has 15,000 employees. See http://ice.gov/pi/ factsheets/050505ice.htm.
329. See, e.g., INA Sec. 212(a)(9)(A)(i).
330. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. Sec. 325 (prescribing a penalty of six months imprisonment, a
fine or both and deportation and prohibition for reentry for a number of years.) see also
generally 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1227.
331. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, DHS Closes Loophole By
Expanding Expedited Removal to Cover Illegal Alien Families, (May 16, 2006) at
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/060516dc.htm (last visited June 14, 2006).
332. See 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1227(a)(1)(F).
333. For example, citizens who enter into fraudulent marriages to benefit foreign
nationals are subject to criminal penalties under The Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 (IRCA). See Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 339 (codified as amended in
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deportation cannot be prescribed as a punishment for citizens who
commit crimes, other forms of penalties are prescribed for aiding
aliens to break the law.3" That is an additional suggestion that
deportation is used as just another breed of criminal punishment.
The House Judiciary Committee Report on the purpose of the
criminal deportation provisions of AEDPA, begins with the following
statement: "The increasing public attention paid to our nation's
immigration policies has brought to light the high number of aliens,
both legal and illegal, who commit crimes while enjoying the benefits
'
of this country."335
In fact, the sentiment reflected in this statement
was exactly the sentiment that caused the introduction of the concept
of assigning a higher degree of criminal guilt to those who commit
crimes while being immigrants in 1917.336 The legislative history of
the very first Act of Congress that introduced this concept suggests
that it was necessary to hold them to a different standard than citizens
because of the "abuse of their invitation. 33 7 That is why they are
punished by deportation even today.3
Thus, the measure is
retributive in nature.
5. Is the Behavior to Which It Applies Already a Crime?
The answer to this query is simple. For purposes of this analysis,
deportation applies precisely because of the commission of a specific
type of crime designated to be deportable. Both the criminal penalty
and deportation are imposed for the exact same underlying criminal
conduct. Hence no further inquiry of this segment of the Kennedy
test is necessary.

scattered sections of 8 U.S.C); see also The Immigration Marriage Fraud Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-639, 10 Stat 3537 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
334. Id.
335. See House Judiciary Committee Report, Criminal Alien Deportation
Improvements Act of 1995, Anti Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
House Report No. 104-22,) Feb, 1995) at 5 (Legislative history providing the background
and purpose of the AEDPA of 1996).
336. See Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Sec. 19, 39 Stat. 874, see also R.P.
Hutchinson, Legislative History of American Immigration Law, 1798-1965 (1981) both
cited in Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment,supra note 230 at 149-150.
337. See Congressional Record, 53: 5167-5172, cited in Bleichmar, at 150.
338. See, e.g., Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportationas Punishment: Why at Least
Some of the Constitution'sCriminalProcedure ProtectionsMust Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV.
305, 333-334 (2000). (identifying intent to punish in recent immigration laws).
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Is There an Alternative Purpose to Which It May Rationally be
Connected as Assignable?

This is the most seeming obstacle to the argument that all the
seven Kennedy factors indicate that deportation is a punishment.
Theoretically, there is an alternative purpose that deportation serves.
For example, in the seminal case of Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme
Court said that: "The purpose of deportation is not to punish past
transgressions but to put an end to a continued violation of the
immigration laws.,1 39 This suggests that deportation is mainly
designed to serve a remedial purpose. Multiple interrelated purposes
could be assigned to this remedial purpose, most notably enforcing
the nation's immigration laws, removing undesirables and ridding the
society of potentially harmful individuals."
Although this proposition is true to a large extent, it contains
notable fallacies. It suggests that deportation as applied to all classes
of aliens serves the same purposes, i.e., "putting an end to a continued
violation of immigration laws" or ridding the society of harmful
individuals.
None of these alternative purposes could be validly assigned to
the deportation of refugees. Firstly, refugees, by virtue of their
refugee status, are in the country lawfully as such there would be no
continued violation of immigration law that needs to be put to an end.
They are deported not because their refugee status is terminated and
they have become without valid immigration status but because of
their commission of designated crimes that they are stripped of their
status for the sole purpose of deportation. In fact, the BIA firmly
stated that termination of refugee status before convicted refugees
could be processed for deportation is unnecessary."
This indicates that the seeming argument that an alternative
purpose may be assignable to deportation is not valid as applied to
339. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984).
340. See, e.g., Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (noting that the purpose
of deportation is to remove harmful individuals from the society.) See also Mahler v. Eby,
264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (suggesting that deportation is designed to rid the society of harmful
individuals.).
341. See In Re Sejid Smriko, 23 I. & N. Dec. 836, 838, Interim Decision (BIA) 3520,
2005 Wl 3075402 (BIA) (2005) (holding that "The consistent reference to any alien in the
statutory provisions governing removal proceedings and the luck of mention of prior
termination of refugee status are strong indications that aliens admitted as refugees are
subject to removal proceedings without the preliminary step of terminating refugee status
under Section 207(c)(4).") (Also holding: "[A] refugee admitted as a lawful permanent
resident.., is not immunized from the grounds for removal that are applicable to all other
aliens."). Id. at 840.
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refugees who have been recognized as such. However, the argument
that ridding the society of harmful individuals as an alternative
purpose may be a valid argument but does not in any way exclude the
punitive character because the same could be said about all the classic
forms of criminal punishment including imprisonment and the death
penalty. Even if deportation is said to be a valid alternative purpose,
it certainly is exceedingly excessive as it is applied to refugees. The
proportionality issue is the subject of the next inquiry.
7.

Is it Excessive in Relation to the Alternative Purpose Assigned?

"There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive
torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status
in organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than
torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that
was centuries in the development. '' 1 2 The Supreme Court said this in
relation to loss of nationality but it is equally applicable to loss of
refugee status and consequent deportation. The only difference
would be that physical mistreatment and primitive torture may
literally be involved when a refugee is deported to a place where he
fears persecution. Refugee status is granted precisely because of a
well-founded fear of these kinds of jeopardy to human well-being."
As discussed in subsection 2 above, banishment from a place
where a person calls home has always been considered among the
severest of punishments. When it is applied to a refugee who has
committed a crime, it is excessive per se because the refugee had
already served a criminal penalty deemed proportionate to the crime.
However, this Kennedy factor requires that it be weighed against the
alternative purpose assigned to it. The notable alternative purpose
identified in the previous subsection is ridding the society of
potentially harmful individuals. The inquiry must necessarily involve
the assessment of the harmfulness of each individual deemed eligible
for deportation.
Society often measures the harmfulness of
individuals by their conducts. A person who commits murder is often
viewed as a dangerous individual; however, a juvenile who commits
shoplifting may not be so regarded. The criminal penalty society
imposes on them varies accordingly."
In fact, proportionality of

342. Tropp v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958). In short, the Court said, losing
nationality is losing the right to have rights. Id. at 102.
343. See INA Sec. 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101 (a)(42).
344. For a discussion of proportionality of punishment, see generally DRESSLER,
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 231 at 45-63.
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Theoretically, all criminal

punishments are designed to fit the crime. Hence, a person who has
been convicted of a crime and served the sentence imposed according
to the applicable law is considered to have not only served a

proportionate penalty but also reformed enough to be released into
the society. Presumably, society incapacitates those who are
considered to be dangerous by imprisonment or the death penalty

where it applies.
Deportation, however, targets a very small
percentage of society's offenders because of their citizenship status,
increasingly without regard to their actual dangerousness. Evidently,
deportation is prescribed not for their crimes or dangerousness but
because of their alienage. It is an additional punishment and as such
excessive without more.
As indicated above, the deportation of refugees also has a unique
dimension of excessiveness. By definition, they are sent to a place

where they may face persecution, i.e., to a place where they may face
a serious jeopardy to their life and limb, which may include
imprisonment, torture, or death because of the reasons that caused
their flight from home in the first place.346 The deportation of
refugees is thus unique because the deporting authorities know that
they are sending them back to a place where there is a real possibility
that they would face persecution. 47 Placing a person in a situation of

345. See U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. See also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371
(1910) (holding that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment
applies to greatly disproportionate punishments.) citing O'Neil v. Vermont, 114 U.S. 323,
339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
346. These reasons may be one or more of the following: race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or social group. See INA Sec. 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101 (a)(42).
347. The term "persecution" would generally mean "a threat to life or freedom" or
generally serious violations of human rights. See UNHCR, Handbook on the Procedures
and Criteria for the Determination of Refugee Status, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (Reedited,
Geneva, 1992 UNHCR 1979) at paras. 51-60. available at http://www.unhcr.ch. For a
discussion of persecution in different contexts see Djordje v. INS, 407 F. 2d 102 (9th Cir.)
See also Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 f. 3d. 641 (9th Cir. 1997). The degree of risk and stand of
proof in refugee status determination is a complex subject. For the purposes of this
discussion, it is sufficient to note that a refugee who has been granted asylum or
withholding of deportation is presumed to have a real possibility of persecution if
returned. Two seminal Supreme Court cases offer a comprehensive guidance pertaining
to the standards applicable to the degree and likelihood of future persecution in the
discretionary grant of asylum and mandatory relief of withholding of deportation. See
generally, INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984) and INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987). A related argument that might be raised here concerns the relief of withholding of
deportation under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the implementing
legislation. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.3 (1988), reprinted in Human Rights,
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dire predicament where he might be detained, tortured, mistreated,
and possibly killed would as a matter of commonsense make
deportation excessive as compared to the alternative purpose that it
could possibly serve.' 8
Therefore, the application of all the seven Kennedy factors

designed to screen the punitive nature of nominally civil sanctions
suggest that deportation is indeed a criminal punishment as applied

against refugees.

A Compilation of International Instruments, 212, at art. 3. See also implementing
legislation Foreign Affairs and Restructuring Act of 1998, P.L. 105-277. CAT relief is,
however, available only to those refugees who could establish that they will more likely
than not be tortured. The only predicament they could plead is torture and the standard
of proof is higher than establishing an asylum claim under INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca cited
above. Perhaps the great majority of refugees could not meet such a high standard. Even
if they do meet the "more likely than not" standard, they may not meet the torture
requirement as regular imprisonment and other forms of persecution are not covered
under the definition of torture. CAT defines torture as: "Any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflected on a person..." See CAT
at art. 1. While CAT relief has a broader coverage as it does not prohibit convicts from
seeking the relief, it is narrower in many resects some of which are indicated above. For a
comparison of CAT and Asylum relief, see generally, Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F. 3d 1279
(9th Cir. 2001).
348. It might, however, be argued that the mistreatment that the refugee may face in
the hands of other sovereigns, though regrettable, is not a second jeopardy by the United
States, and it is at best an unintended consequence. However, this article consistently
argued that the second jeopardy or punishment is not solely the possibility of future
persecution but the very act of deportation itself because it takes the refugee away from a
place where he had found safety and started a life at a minimum. By definition,
punishment is simply a pain or deprivation that people wish to avoid. See note 231 supra.
The act of deportation itself places the refugee in a situation where he could face the
feared mistreatment whether it materializes or not. Placing the refugee under such
circumstances, would put him in a situation that he wishes to avoid. More importantly, the
gist of this article's argument is not to challenge the constitutionality of every conceivable
execution of the immigration law authorizing the deportation of refugees who commit
crimes but to show that there certainly is an unconstitutional application in many
instances. For example, in 2003 alone 78,000 criminal aliens were deported. See
http//www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/dro050404.htm (last visited on June 14, 2006). It is
obvious that some proportion of that number is refugees. It is also obvious that some
proportion of the deported refugees would be subjected to persecution upon returnunless 100 percent of the evaluation of the risk in the initial refugee status determination
process is said to have been wrong. Moreover, the question relating to the materialization
of the feared persecution pertains only to one of the seven Kennedy factors discussed
above, i.e., excessiveness. This article argues that deportation is excessive per se without
the addition of persecution, but the possibility of persecution makes it exceedingly
excessive. In fact, for the refugee involved, it is not a matter of statistics or mathematical
probabilities, at least in his perception, it is often a question of life and death.
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V. Conclusion
There is no gainsaying that deportation as a prescription for a
refugee's commission of a specific class of crimes is a punishment. As
James Madison said, "[I]f banishment of this sort be not a
punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be
difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied." 9
Deportation is considered a civil sanction only because of a precedent
that has its roots in the Chinese Exclusion era, the very nomenclature
that Professor Henkin describes as an "embarrassment.""35 It was an
era "when the Bill of Rights had not yet become our national
hallmark and the principal justification and preoccupation of judicial
review."35'
Refugees are a unique category of aliens who enjoy the dual
protection of the Constitution as well as international law.
Deportation of refugees who commit crimes is a second punishment
for the same offense not only as a matter of statutory interpretation
but also because all the tests traditionally applied to determine the
punitive nature of nominally civil sanctions indicate that it is a
punishment. It involves a serious disability, it has historically been
considered and used as a punishment, and it is mainly applied for a
commission of specific types of crimes that require scienter. It
undoubtedly serves the traditional purposes of punishment and is also
excessive to any alternative purpose that it may serve.
The precedent that holds that deportation is a civil sanction not
only transgresses the contemporary notions of fundamental fairness
and justice but also contradicts conventional jurisprudence. It is time
for reconsideration. Every single deportation of a refugee who has
served his penalty for a criminal conduct would put him twice in
jeopardy. This kind of continued violation of the constitutional
guarantee against Double Jeopardy must be put to an end. This
article has attempted to provide the arguments in favor of this
revision.
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